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Whither the Lofty Goals of the
Environmental Laws?:
Can Statutory Directives Restore
Purposivism When We Are All
Textualists Now?
Stephen M. Johnson*
Abstract
Congress set ambitious goals to protect public health and the environment when it enacted the federal environmental laws through bipartisan efforts in the 1970s. For many years, the federal courts interpreted the environmental laws to carry out those enacted purposes. Over time, however,
courts greatly reduced their focus on the environmental and public health
purposes of the environmental laws when interpreting those statutes due to
the rise in textualism, the declining influence of the Chevron doctrine, and the
increasing willingness of courts to defer to agency underenforcement of statutory responsibilities across all regulatory statutes.
In 2020, the Environmental Protection Network, a coalition of former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees from across the political
spectrum, issued a report identifying the priorities for resetting the course of
EPA. At the top of the list of priorities, the group urged EPA to “reaffirm its
commitment to fully protect public health and the environment.” Even if EPA
were to follow that advice and sought to aggressively interpret and enforce
the environmental laws to achieve their enacted purposes, the agency could
be thwarted by the judicial trends outlined above were its actions challenged
in court. Congressional action may be required to counter these trends and
reinvigorate the federal environmental laws.
* Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M.
George Washington University School of Law.
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The very simple, straightforward tool that Congress could use to reinvigorate the laws would be a statutory directive. Congress could amend the
Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, RCRA, Superfund, and the Endangered Species Act to explicitly provide that the laws should be interpreted to carry out
their enacted purposes to protect public health and the environment. Through
such statutory directives, Congress could send a clear message to courts that
it remains committed to the goals articulated in the environmental laws. Textualist judges would find it difficult to ignore the statutory purposes when interpreting the environmental laws, as the text of the laws would require the
laws to be interpreted to advance those purposes. Similarly, judges who ignore Chevron to avoid deferring to an agency’s environmentally friendly interpretation would be unable to reject the agency’s position through their own
statutory interpretation without addressing the statutory directive in the law
requiring an interpretation of the law to carry out its public health and environmental purposes.
Although Congress has underutilized statutory directives, state legislatures routinely enact them, and other academics have advocated for the creation of Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation or other tools to standardize
statutory interpretation by courts. While some commentators have raised separation of powers concerns regarding statutory directives, many commentators assert that courts do not have a monopoly on statutory interpretation and
that the statutory interpretation rules adopted by courts are federal common
law rules that can be adopted or amended by Congress. Accordingly, a directive like the one proposed in this Article that focuses on a limited number
of statutes and only directs courts to interpret the statutes consistently with
enacted purposes provisions in the statutes should be consistent with Congress’s Article I powers.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past four years, federal agencies took unprecedented steps to
dismantle environmental protections established under the nation’s environmental laws.1 In response to the magnitude of those actions, a coalition of
former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees from across the
political spectrum joined together to form the Environmental Protection Network to oppose the draconian actions.2 In a report issued in 2020 that addressed resetting the course of EPA, the group identified as the top priority
that “EPA must reaffirm its commitment to fully protect public health and the
environment.”3 After he was elected in 2020, President Biden pledged to restore environmental protections and reverse many of the former Administration’s policies.4
President Biden may, however, encounter some roadblocks in his efforts
to reinvigorate federal environmental protections due to major shifts in statutory interpretation approaches in the federal judiciary.5 The major federal environmental laws, adopted by strong bipartisan majorities almost a half century ago, generally include broad statements indicating Congress’s primary
purpose in enacting the laws—protecting health and the environment.6 In the
decades immediately following the enactment of the laws, the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts, in cases like Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill7 and
1. See infra Part II.
2. See About Us, ENV’T PROT. NETWORK, https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
3. See ENV’T PROT. NETWORK, RESETTING THE COURSE OF EPA: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NETWORK 1, 4 (2020), https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Resetting-the-Course-of-EPA-Report.pdf [hereinafter EPN
REPORT]. In addition, the group recommended that “[i]n fulfilling its mission, EPA should prioritize
its commitment to communities that suffer disproportionate environmental burdens.” Id. at 6.
4. See Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis & John Muyskens, Tracking Biden’s Environmental Actions,
WASH. POST: CLIMATE & ENV’T (Oct. 14, 2021, 11:46 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/climate-environment/biden-climate-environment-actions/
(“Beginning
from his first day in office, Biden has moved quickly to undo the environmental track record of his
predecessor, and to center climate action as a key priority.”).
5. See id.; see also infra Part III (analyzing the shift towards textualism within the federal judiciary).
6. See Richard J. Lazarus & Sara Zdeb, Environmental Law & Politics, 19 INSIGHTS ON L. &
SOC’Y 11, 13 (2018) (noting Congress’s enactment of environmental laws “with overwhelming bipartisan majorities”); see also infra notes 86–94 and accompanying text.
7. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,8 routinely interpreted the
laws expansively to carry out those purposes.9 Over time, however, the federal courts have greatly reduced their focus on the environmental and health
protection purposes of those statutes in interpreting their meaning and scope.10
Indeed, if the courts consider statutory purposes at all, they are frequently
more likely to focus on the states’ rights provisions in the laws than the environmental and health protection purposes of the laws.11 They are also increasingly likely to find that the laws authorize or require the government to balance the health and environmental protection goals of the statutes against their
costs.12
Several trends have contributed to this shift in federal judicial interpretation of the environmental laws.13 First, in interpreting statutes, federal courts
have increasingly embraced textualism and rejected consideration of statutory
purposes and legislative history.14 That trend is likely to continue or accelerate with the unprecedented rate of federal judicial appointments by former
President Trump between 2016 and 2020.15
8. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
9. See infra notes 97–112 and accompanying text.
10. See David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck & Brandon T. Metroka, Half a Century of Supreme
Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1781, 1785 (2018) [hereinafter Driesen et al., Half a Century] (analyzing the argument
“that the Court has shifted from an approach to statutory interpretation that relied heavily on purposivism—the custom of giving statutory goals weight in interpreting statutes—toward one that relies more
heavily on textualism”).
11. See Stephen M. Johnson, From Protecting Water Quality to Protecting States’ Rights: Fifty
Years of Supreme Court Clean Water Act Statutory Interpretation, 74 SMU L. REV. 359, 359 (2021)
[hereinafter Johnson, Clean Water Act] (“[T]o the limited extent that the Court focuses on the purposes
of the [Clean Water Act], it cites the language in § 101(b) of the law that discusses a Congressional
policy to preserve and protect states’ rights.”).
12. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1841 (noting the Supreme Court’s shift
toward “requiring EPA to consider costs”).
13. See id.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV.
455, 456 (2020) (arguing that “symmetry plays . . . an important role in depoliticizing administrative
law”).
14. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1787 (“The standard accounts of statutory
interpretation suggest that the Supreme Court’s approach shifted from a heavy reliance on purpose to
a much heavier reliance on text.”).
15. See generally Mark Sherman, Kevin Freking & Matthew Daly, Trump’s Court Appointments
Will Leave Decades-Long Imprint, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-judiciary-coronavirus-pandemic-us-supreme-court-
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Second, the federal courts are moving away from deferring to the statutory interpretation of federal agencies under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.16 From 1984 through the beginning of the
twenty-first century, federal courts routinely deferred to agency statutory interpretation under the Chevron doctrine to uphold actions by federal agencies
that often advanced the environmental and public health protection purposes
of the environmental laws.17 However, courts have created exceptions to
Chevron and are frequently finding ways to avoid applying the test or to avoid
deferring to agencies under the test.18 In addition, in the years since the Supreme Court decided National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services,19 the federal appellate courts have been less deferential to
EPA in Chevron cases and have been more likely to rely on the text of the
statutes when interpreting the federal environmental laws.20
Third, several scholars have demonstrated that federal courts routinely
defer to environmental agencies’ decisions to underenforce the federal environmental laws, even as those courts adopt a more aggressive approach toward judicial review when the agencies are carrying out the health and environmental protection purposes of the laws.21
All of these trends undercut Congress’s overriding purposes in enacting
the federal environmental laws a half century ago to protect public health and
the environment, so it may be necessary for Congress to intervene to reverse
these trends.22 Although Congress has made very few revisions to the federal
c37607c9987888058d3d0650eea125cd (“[Trump] has left an imprint on federal courts that will outlast
his one term in office for decades to come.”).
16. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Brand X Effect: Declining Chevron Deference for EPA and Increased Success for Environmental Groups in the 21st Century, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 67
(2018) [hereinafter Johnson, Brand X Effect] (noting “a change in the judicial attitude towards agencies after Chevron”).
18. See id. at 77–78.
19. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
20. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 78–79.
21. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 13, at 491 (stating that in light of “[t]he presumption of unreviewability for agency enforcement decisions announced in Heckler v. Chaney,” courts have employed
a “hands-off” approach to challenges of underenforcement).
22. See Lazarus & Zdeb, supra note 6; Kevin M. Stack, The Enacted Purposes Canon, 105 IOWA
L. REV. 283 (2019) [hereinafter Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon] (explaining that most federal environmental laws have “enacted purposes” provisions that outline the true purpose and goal of the laws
to protect public health and the environment); see also infra Part V.
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environmental laws over the last few decades,23 it may be necessary for Congress to act in order to reinvigorate those laws.24 The very simple, straightforward tool that Congress could use to reinvigorate the laws would be a statutory directive, a tool that is frequently used by state legislatures but
underutilized at the federal level.25 Congress could amend the Clean Water
Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Superfund, and the Endangered Species Act to explicitly provide that the laws
should be interpreted to carry out their enacted purposes to protect public
health and the environment.26
By including such a directive in the laws, it would be clear to textualist
judges that the statutory language should always be interpreted in a way that
advances the health and environmental goals of the statutes.27 Purposivism
would not be a theory of interpretation but rather a requirement of the statutory
text.28 Similarly, whether courts deferred to agencies under Chevron or sought
to review an agency’s statutory interpretation more aggressively, judges
would be constrained in their interpretation by the textual mandate to interpret
23. The most recent legislation that amended any of the major federal laws addressed in this Article
in any significant way was the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. See Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. The only other law that made significant amendments to any federal
environmental laws over the past three decades was the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the
21st Century Act, enacted in 2016, which amended the Toxic Substances Control Act. See Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016).
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401; 33 U.S.C. § 1251; 16 U.S.C. § 1531; 42 U.S.C. § 6901; 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601. Although the proposal in this Article is simple and straightforward, the era of bipartisan support for environmental legislation, or any legislation, has long passed. See, e.g., Noel Rubinton, In a
Polarized Era, Efforts To Boost Bipartisanship in Congress, HEWLETT FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://hewlett.org/making-bipartisanship-stick-in-congress/ (discussing the decline in bipartisanship
in Congress over the past several decades). Without bipartisan support, the proposal that is the subject
of this Article would likely only be advanced by the Democratic Party, which currently has a very
narrow margin of control in Congress. See James Arkin, Democrats Plot To Defend Fragile Senate
Majority, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/21/democrats-defendsenate-majority-460984 (describing the Democrats’ efforts to defend their position in the Senate after
winning “the narrowest possible majority”); Philip Bump, Here’s How Narrow the Democratic House
Majority Is, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/07/hereshow-narrow-democratic-house-majority-is/.
27. See infra Section III.B (explaining the principles of textualism and the shift towards this
method of interpretation in the federal judiciary).
28. See infra Part VI (proposing that Congress implement statutory directives in environmental
laws).

291

[Vol. 49: 285, 2022]

Whither the Lofty Goals
of the Environmental Laws
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the statute to carry out its enacted purposes.29 Finally, if the directives were
coupled with requirements that agencies interpret and implement those laws
to carry out the enacted purposes to protect health and the environment, that
could reduce the likelihood that courts would defer to agency underenforcement while aggressively second-guessing agency actions that enforce the statutory goals.30
Although Congress has underutilized statutory directives, state legislatures routinely enact them, and other academics have previously advocated
for the creation of Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation or other tools to
create a more uniform federal approach to interpreting statutes to advance particular policies.31 While some commentators have raised separation of powers
concerns about statutory directives, a directive that focuses on a limited number of statutes and only directs courts to interpret the statutes consistently with
enacted purposes provisions in the statutes should be within Congress’s Article I powers.32 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that an “enacted
purposes” canon already exists for regulatory statutes (such as the environmental laws).33 However, such a canon, if it does exist, has not been adequate
to prevent the judicial erosion of the consideration of the enacted purposes of
the federal environmental laws.34
This Article advocates for the creation of a statutory directive or directives to interpret the major federal environmental laws to advance their enacted purposes to protect health and the environment. Part II of the Article
explores the erosion of federal environmental protections in the Executive
Branch over the past four years and the efforts that are being made to reaffirm
a commitment to public health and the environment in the new

29. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also infra Part VI.
30. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(1). The Endangered Species Act already includes a provision that requires federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the
Endangered Species Act] by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species.” Id.
31. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085 (2002) (proposing the codification of federal rules regarding “certain interpretive tools and techniques”).
32. Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory
Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837 (2009) (exploring how statutory directives can “violate separation of powers”).
33. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22.
34. See infra Parts VI, VII.
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Administration. Part III explores the bipartisan adoption of the federal environmental laws, the early focus on statutory purpose in judicial review of challenges to agency actions under those laws, and the shift to textualism over
time. Part IV examines the decline in Chevron deference as another impediment to interpreting the federal environmental statutes to carry out their broad
goals. Part V outlines the deference that federal courts continue to accord to
agencies when they underenforce the federal environmental laws, in contrast
to the aggressive judicial review that they impose on agency actions that advance the statutory health and environmental protection goals. Part VI describes statutory directives in general and the previous proposals for federal
rules of statutory interpretation or other uniform tools of federal statutory construction and outlines a proposal for limited statutory directives for the federal
environmental statutes. Part VII defends the proposal against constitutional
criticisms that have been leveled against federal statutory directives by some
commentators in the past and discusses the need for statutory directives as
opposed to other alternatives.
II. TIME TO RESET
In the four years of his Administration, President Trump presided over an
unprecedented dismantling of federal environmental protections.35 His agencies reversed, revoked, or rolled back more than one hundred environmental
rules.36 Significantly, EPA weakened carbon dioxide emissions limits on

35. See Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump Administration
Rolled Back More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html.
36. Id. Harvard Law School also maintains a website that tracks the environmental rollbacks
adopted by the Trump Administration and the efforts that the Biden Administration is making to roll
back the rollbacks. See Regulatory Tracker, HARV. L. SCH.: ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021). President
Trump also aggressively sought to reduce the size of EPA’s budget and workforce. See Stephen M.
Johnson, Indeconstructible: The Triumph of the Environmental “Administrative State,” 86 U. CIN. L.
REV. 653, 667–68 (2018) [hereinafter Johnson, Indeconstructible]. In its 2020 report on resetting the
course of EPA, the Environmental Protection Network noted that EPA is now spending, “in real dollars, less than half what the agency spent in 1980.” See EPN REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. Consequently, EPN identified “investing in EPA’s workforce” as another priority, finding that “[c]omplex
challenges of the 21st century cannot be successfully addressed unless EPA leadership rebuilds the
capabilities, productivity, and morale of the EPA workforce[] and creates a more inclusive workforce
that reflects the communities EPA serves.” Id. at 13.
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power plants37 and motor vehicles,38 removed protections for half of the nation’s wetlands,39 and adopted regulations to limit the type of scientific evidence that the agency uses to make decisions.40 EPA also promulgated rules
to limit the agency’s ability to adopt guidance to overturn the changes implemented during the Trump Administration.41 In addition, the Administration
withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord,42 revoked California’s authority to
set more stringent auto emissions standards,43 and revamped membership on
scientific advisory boards across all agencies to increase representation of regulated entities and decrease representation of academic scientists.44 EPA,
however, did not act alone in dismantling environmental protections.45 President Trump’s Interior Department finalized a plan to allow drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,46 lifted a freeze on new coal leases on federal
lands,47 rescinded regulations for fracking on federal lands and Indian lands,48
and rolled back protections for threatened species under the Endangered

37. See 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2019) (finalizing the Affordable Clean Energy rule).
38. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025
Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018) (withdrawing 2017 standards following a
finding by the Administration “that more recent information suggests that the current standards may
be too stringent”).
39. See 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2020) (Navigable Waters Protection Rule).
40. See 40 C.F.R. § 30 (2021) (scientific transparency rule).
41. See 40 C.F.R. § 2 (2020) (guidance rule).
42. See Matt McGrath, Climate Change: U.S. Formally Withdraws from Paris Agreement, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54797743.
43. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 85–86 (2019); 49 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533 (2019) (Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule).
44. See John McQuaid, Trump Officials Act To Tilt Federal Science Boards Toward Industry, SCI.
AM. (May 16, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-officials-act-to-tilt-federalscience-boards-toward-industry/.
45. See Popovich et al., supra note 35.
46. See Notice of 2021 Coastal Plain Alaska Oil and Gas Lease Sale, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,865 (Dec.
7, 2020) (providing notice of lease sale for “tracts in the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge”).
47. See Devin Henry, Trump Administration Ends Obama’s Coal-Leasing Freeze, HILL (Mar. 29,
2017, 3:20 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/326375-interior-department-endsobamas-coal-leasing-freeze.
48. See Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2017) (rescinding
2015 rule).
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Species Act49 and migratory birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.50 In
addition, the White House drastically reduced the borders of two national
monuments in Utah,51 weakened National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
regulations that had been in force for almost half a century,52 and relaxed the
environmental review process for federal infrastructure projects.53
Fortunately for the environment, many of the Administration’s efforts
were invalidated when they were challenged in court.54 Although federal
courts uphold agency decisions about 70% of the time when challenged,55 federal agencies during the Trump Administration prevailed in only about 20%
of the cases in which their decisions were challenged.56 In many of these
49. See Revision of the Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R.
§ 17 (2019) (removing prospectively the blanket protection that existed for threatened wildlife and
plant species once designated as threatened).
50. See Regulations Governing Take of Migratory Birds, 50 C.F.R. § 10 (2021) (redefining “take”
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act so that prohibitions under the act “reach only actions directed at
migratory birds, their nests, or their eggs”).
51. See Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html.
52. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508, 1515–1518 (2020) (detailing the Council on Environmental Quality updates to the National Environmental Policy Act rules).
53. See Accelerating the Nation’s Economic Recovery from the COVID–19 Emergency by Expediting Infrastructure Investments and Other Activities, Exec. Order No. 13,927, 85 Fed. Reg. 35,165
(June 9, 2020). But see Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science To
Tackle the Climate Crisis, Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021) [hereinafter
Exec. Order No. 13,990] (revoking Executive Order 13,927 under the Biden Administration).
54. See Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Litigating EPA Rules: A Fifty-Year Retrospective
of Environmental Rulemaking in the Courts, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1007, 1026–27 (2020) (reviewing eleven studies that found EPA success ranging from 45%–79% and generally around 70% in cases
involving Chevron deference); see also Tucker Higgins, The Trump Administration Has Lost More
Than 90 Percent of Its Court Battles over Deregulation, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:51 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/trump-has-lost-more-than-90-percent-of-deregulation-court-battles.html (noting that the government typically wins about 69% of the time in cases involving challenges to agency action).
55. Higgins, supra note 54.
56. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. INST FOR POL’Y
INTEGRITY, https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (Apr. 1, 2021). According to the N.Y.U.
Institute for Policy Integrity, as of April 1, 2021, agencies under the Trump Administration were successful in fifty-eight of the 258 cases (22.5%) in which their decisions were challenged in court. Id.
For purposes of tracking the success rate of the agencies, the N.Y.U. website says:
An outcome is considered unsuccessful for the Trump [A]dministration if (1) a
court ruled against the agency or (2) the relevant agency withdrew the action
after being sued. If there are different rulings on the same agency action, the
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cases, the agencies acted hastily to overturn environmental protections and
failed to follow procedures required by law, such as providing opportunities
for public participation and adequately explaining the reasons for rejecting
their prior environmentally protective positions.57 The federal courts generally enforced long-standing principles of administrative law to invalidate the
agencies’ actions.58 It is not clear whether the Administration’s widespread
violation of core administrative law principles was based on intentional disregard of those principles, indifference to those principles, ignorance of those
principles, or attempts to “push” the law to change those principles.59 Regardless of the underlying motivations, the agencies’ procedural missteps compromised the legal validity of many of the Administration’s deregulatory efforts.60 Nevertheless, by the end of the Trump Administration, many of the
antienvironmental rules and deregulatory actions had not been overturned in
court.61
entry is assigned an “X” [indicating that it was unsuccessful] as long as one
court ruled against the agency.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Higgins, supra note 54; Coglianese & Walters, supra note 54, at
1032–33. Earthjustice claims to have prevailed in 80% of the judicial challenges it brought against
the Trump Administration. See When We Win, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/features/environmental-lawsuits-trump-administration (Feb. 22, 2021). The Center for Biological Diversity claims
to have a 90% success rate in suits brought against the Trump Administration. See Administration
Lawsuit Tracker, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/trump_lawsuits/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
57. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 54, at 1033–34. Professors Coglianese and Walters note
that EPA ignored staff recommendations in many of the cases where courts invalidated its regulations,
which the authors suggest supports “a strong endorsement of the view that expert staff work has had
something to do with the rough equilibrium between EPA and the courts over the last half century.”
Id. at 1034; see also Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory
Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1653–54, 1669–70 (2019) (noting that Trump Administration
agencies’ actions have been invalidated because agencies improperly suspended the effective dates of
final rules, failed to provide for notice and comment for rules, failed to meet mandatory deadlines in
statutes, failed to make findings required by statutes before taking actions, and failed to sufficiently
justify or support their actions).
58. See Glicksman & Hammond, supra note 57, at 1656.
59. Id. at 1654–56. Professors Glicksman and Hammond refer to the blatant disregard of administrative law principles based on intent or indifference as “regulatory slop,” which they view to be
“extremely concerning.” Id. Ultimately, however, the authors suggest that more research is necessary
before it can be determined whether the agencies during the Trump Administration were ignoring
settled principles of administrative law intentionally or whether the agencies’ decisionmakers were
simply inexperienced or attempting to “push” the law in new directions. Id. at 1713–14.
60. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
61. See Eilperin et al., supra note 4 (identifying over one hundred actions taken during the Trump
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President Biden acted swiftly and aggressively almost immediately after
taking office to attempt to reverse many of the environmentally harmful actions taken during the Trump Administration.62 On his first day in office, the
President temporarily halted oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, revoked a permit for the Keystone XL oil pipeline, and announced
that the United States would rejoin the Paris Climate Accord.63 Shortly after
that, he required federal agencies to review more than one hundred rules that
were adopted during the previous four years to weaken protections for the
environment and natural resources.64 Where President Trump adopted policies through executive orders and guidance, President Biden can rescind those
policies through similar expedient measures.65 However, where the Trump
Administration weakened environmental protections through legislative rules,
President Biden can only restore those protections by revoking those rules or
adopting new rules, both of which would require time-consuming notice and
comment rulemaking.66
Administration that adversely affect the environment and were still in effect at the time that President
Trump left office).
62. See id. (tracking the actions taken by the Biden Administration to address the environmental
rollbacks from the Trump Administration); Coral Davenport, Restoring Environmental Rules Rolled
Back by Trump Could Take Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/climate/biden-environment.html.
63. See Eliza Relman, Biden Reverses Trump’s Major Environmental Rollbacks with Executive
Orders Rejoining the Paris Accord, Cancelling the Keystone Pipeline, and Ending Drilling in the
Arctic Wildlife Refuge, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2021, 2:30 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-takes-immediate-action-climate-rejoins-paris-accord-keystone-2021-1;
see
also Exec. Order No. 13,990, supra note 53, §§ 4, 6 (addressing the moratorium on leases in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Section 4 and revoking the Keystone XL Permit in Section 6).
64. See Exec. Order No. 13,990, supra note 53, § 2; see also Davenport, supra note 62.
65. See Eilperin et al., supra note 4; Davenport, supra note 62. However, the Trump Administration made it more difficult for EPA to replace guidance documents when the Administration adopted
a rule that requires the agency to follow new procedures when adopting guidance documents. See 40
C.F.R. § 2 (2020).
66. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(explaining how a legislative act is necessary to amend agency-created rules); Nat’l Fam. Plan. &
Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the need for a legislative act to amend a regulation and stating that where a “subsequent interpretation [of a statute] runs
180 degrees counter to the plain meaning of the regulation[, it] gives us at least some cause to believe
that the agency may be seeking to constructively amend the regulation”); see also Davenport, supra
note 62. Even if the agency only plans to repeal the rule rather than replace the rule, it must use notice
and comment rulemaking. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing general notice and comment requirements, including those for “amendment, modification,
or repeal,” and the exceptions that do not need to adhere to these requirements, including “interpretive
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In some ways, the tools are in place to enable President Biden to rescind
many of the Trump Administration’s rules or to adopt new rules to expand
protections for the environment and natural resources.67 The federal environmental statutes include broad statements of goals to protect public health and
the environment and to provide the federal government with broad discretion
to carry out those goals.68 However, the Biden Administration will likely encounter some roadblocks, both administratively and in the courts, in revoking
Trump-era rules and adopting new rules to expand protections for the environment and natural resources.69
Administratively, EPA lost many career employees at the senior staff
level (and the institutional memory that they possessed) during the Trump
Administration.70 The reduction in the agency’s budget and staff between
2016 and 2020 will present some roadblocks to swift rulemaking action on
many fronts.71 Judicial roadblocks may, however, be of greater concern.72
Although the Biden Administration is unlikely to make the same procedural
and substantive errors that the Trump Administration made in adopting rules,
new rules adopted by the Biden Administration will surely be challenged in
court and will face scrutiny from a federal judiciary that increasingly ignores
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, practice or procedure”); Env’t Def.
Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (highlighting APA Section 551(5)’s inclusion
of “repeal of a rule” as a form of rulemaking). There was a small window of opportunity for Congress
to reverse some of the rules that were adopted at the end of the Trump Administration through the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808, but most of the major rules that the Biden Administration targeted for review fell outside of that window. See Davenport, supra note 62. Ultimately,
Congress only chose to review one environmental rule through the Congressional Review Act. See
Rebecca Beitsch, Democrats Target Trump Methane Rule with Congressional Review Act, HILL (Mar.
25, 2021, 11:02 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/544886-democrats-to-targettrump-methane-rule-with-congressional-review (discussing the joint resolution introduced in the
House and Senate to disapprove an EPA rule that withdrew limits on methane emissions from oil and
gas production).
67. See Davenport, supra note 62 (discussing that the Biden Administration has among its “array
of legal tools to reinstate environmental protections” Biden’s executive authority and congressional
action through the Congressional Review Act and noting that the Biden Administration can also issue
new environmental regulations).
68. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 327.
69. See Popovich et al., supra note 35 (noting that EPA’s administrative staff and budget were
reduced during the Trump Administration); see also Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1044 (detailing the requirements courts demand an administration must meet to repeal a previous administration’s rules).
70. See Popovich et al., supra note 35.
71. See Davenport, supra note 62.
72. See generally Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 78–79.
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the purposes and goals of laws when interpreting statutory language.73 The
federal judiciary is also deferring less frequently to agencies under Chevron
when reviewing their statutory interpretation74 and is being more aggressive
when reviewing agencies’ actions to enforce a statute’s goals and purposes
than when reviewing agencies’ failure to enforce those goals and purposes.75
All of these judicial trends may make it difficult for the Biden Administration
to achieve the 70% success rate in court that was the norm prior to the Trump
Administration.76
III. FROM PURPOSIVISM TO TEXTUALISM
A. The Early Years of the Federal Environmental Laws
The 1970s and early 1980s was an era of unparalleled bipartisan congressional support for environmental protection.77 During that period, Congress
adopted more than two dozen environmental laws with broad support across
the political spectrum.78 During that time, “environmental bills pass[ed] the
Senate by an average vote of 76 to 5 and the House by an average of 331 to
30.”79 It was during that era that most of the major federal environmental laws
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 54, at 1026–27.
77. See David M. Uhlmann, Back to the Future: Creating a Bipartisan Environmental Movement
for the 21st Century, [2020] 50 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,800, 10,801 (Oct. 2020) (explaining how environmental disasters motivated bipartisan support for the passage of new regulations).
78. See id.; see also Johnson, Indeconstructible, supra note 36, at 654; Madeline June Kass, Presidentially Appointed Environmental Agency Saboteurs, 87 UMKC L. REV. 697, 701 (2019) (illustrating how EPA was created through bipartisan support); Joel A. Mintz, Thinking Beyond Gridlock: Towards a Consistent Statutory Approach to Federal Environmental Enforcement, 46 ENV’T L. 241, 242
(2016) (explaining how regulations created in the 1970s and 1980s with bipartisan support remain
largely unchanged); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA.
ENV’T L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007) (explaining how safeguarding the environment used to be an “exciting,”
bipartisan field).
79. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Global Warming and the Problem of Policy Innovation: Lessons
from the Early Environmental Movement, 39 ENV’T L. 285, 306 (2009) (arguing for policy changes
under the current climate circumstances). The Clean Water Act, for instance, passed unanimously in
the Senate and passed the House with only eleven dissenters. See COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93D CONG.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 222–
23 (1973) (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also Drew Caputo, A
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were enacted, including the modern Clean Air Act,80 Clean Water Act,81 Endangered Species Act,82 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,83 and the
Superfund law.84 Over the subsequent half century, Congress has not taken
any steps to diminish significantly the protections provided by those laws or
reduce the powers provided to federal agencies to interpret and enforce those
laws.85
Most of the major federal environmental laws were enacted in response
to national crises, such as the Santa Barbara oil spill, the burning Cuyahoga
River, and the environmental and health hazards posed by toxic waste to residents in Love Canal, Times Beach, and other communities across the United
States.86 Consequently, at the center of most of the federal environmental
laws are “enacted purposes” provisions that outline the overriding goals of the
laws to protect public health and the environment.87
The Clean Water Act, for example, provides that the objective of the law
is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the [n]ation’s waters.”88 To achieve that objective, Congress set a national
goal to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.89
The Clean Air Act identifies a major purpose of the law: “to protect and enhance the quality of the [n]ation’s air resources so as to promote the public
Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, [1997] 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,574 (1997) (providing a more detailed history of the enactment of the law and the events that predated it).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6901.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
85. See Johnson, Indeconstructible, supra note 36, at 654.
86. See Uhlmann, supra note 77, at 10,801.
87. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 290 (stating that enacted purposes provisions are provisions in statutes that are enacted as part of the statute and “make statements regarding
the aims, goals, or ends of the statute they accompany[] and . . . purport to speak to the entire statute
in which they are enacted”). Modern congressional legislative drafting guidelines discourage the inclusion of purpose provisions unless the purpose provision addresses a specific section of the legislation. See HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 1041, at 28 (1995) (Section 325 specifically discourages “the inclu[sion] [of] findings and purposes”).
According to the manual, purpose provisions “are more appropriately and safely dealt with in the
committee report than in the bill.” Id.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
89. Id.
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health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”90 Congress
identified the objectives of RCRA to be “to promote the protection of health
and the environment”91 and indicated that the objectives should be met by
“assuring that hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the environment.”92 In the Endangered
Species Act, Congress indicated that the purposes of the law are “to provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved[ and] to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”93 Although
the Superfund law does not include a separate enacted purposes provision, the
short title of the law indicates that Congress adopted it “[t]o provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites.”94
After outlining the primary purposes of the laws to protect public health
and the environment, many of the federal environmental statutes identify retention of state authority over matters addressed in the statutes as an additional
goal.95 Occasionally, some of the federal environmental laws include
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
92. Id.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
94. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767. Some of the other federal environmental laws are more equivocal about
advancing health and environmental goals. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(a), (c); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3). In the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), for instance, although Congress provided that “each person should enjoy a healthful environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c), it also provided that governments and public and private organizations should “use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony[] and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” Id. § 4331(a) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in the Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress directed that “authority over chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation.” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3).
95. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1535(a) (requiring the federal government to “cooperate to the maximum
extent practicable with the [s]tates” in carrying out the Endangered Species Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f)
(authorizing states to adopt requirements that are more protective of endangered and threatened species
than the federal requirements); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (identifying a Congressional policy “to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of [s]tates to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution[ and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources” under the Clean
Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (authorizing states to adopt and enforce water pollution standards unless
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provisions allowing the consideration of costs in setting some standards under
the laws, but most of the laws are silent or ambiguous on that point.96
In the first few decades after Congress adopted the major federal environmental laws, federal courts frequently interpreted the laws broadly to carry
out the health and environmental protection purposes of the laws.97 Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,98 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,99
and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon100
typify the approach taken by the Supreme Court during those years.101 In Tennessee Valley Authority, the Court was faced with the question of whether it
was appropriate to enjoin the completion of a hundred-million-dollar dam that
would destroy the critical habitat and jeopardize the continued existence of an
endangered fish.102 Although the statute’s plain language made it clear that
completion of the dam would violate the Endangered Species Act, the law did
not explicitly address whether a court was required to enjoin any violation of
the statute regardless of the costs that would be imposed on a developer by
such an injunction.103 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court thoroughly examined
they are less stringent than the federal standards); 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (identifying a goal of providing technical and financial assistance to states for the development of solid waste management plans
under the RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (authorizing states to adopt hazardous waste laws that are at least
as stringent as the federal requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(3) (setting out a purpose “to provide
technical and financial assistance to [s]tate and local governments in connection with the development
and execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs”); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (authorizing
states to adopt air pollution control standards unless they are less stringent than the federal standards).
96. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (authorizing EPA to consider costs in determining the best
practicable control technology limits under the Clean Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4) (authorizing
EPA to consider costs in determining the best conventional control technology under the Clean Water
Act).
97. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA.
ENV’T L.J. 75, 95 (2001) (“[D]uring the 1970s the federal judiciary served as a significant catalyst in
support of sweeping, far-reaching, and stringent environmental protection law.”).
98. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
99. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
100. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
101. See id.; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
102. 437 U.S. at 153–54, 172.
103. See id. at 193–95. The decision is frequently cited as an example of textualism because the
Court focused heavily on the plain meaning of the language in the statute when determining that the
construction of the dam would violate the statute. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A
Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106
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the enacted purposes section of the statute and the legislative history of the
statute and concluded that the “plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute
was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost.”104
A few decades later, in Babbitt, the Court reviewed a challenge to the
Department of Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act by regulation to prohibit habitat modification that indirectly injured endangered species.105 In upholding the agency’s rule, the Court relied on the “broad purpose” cited in the enacting clause of the statute, which it referred to as “the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation.”106 The Court explicitly relied on Tennessee Valley Authority in finding that the goal of the Endangered Species Act “was to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost,” and
the Court upheld the agency’s rule as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.107
The Supreme Court’s purposivist approach to interpreting federal environmental laws was not limited to the Endangered Species Act.108 In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court reviewed a challenge to regulations adopted
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters to be “waters of the United States” that are subject to
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.109 While the Court suggested that,
CORNELL L. REV. 591, 595 (2021) (“Consider Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill . . . . Chief Justice
Warren Burger’s opinion for the Court sounded themes that we would now associate with textualism
. . . .”). However, since the language of the statute did not address whether courts were required to
issue injunctions to prevent actions that violated the statute, the Court adopted a purposivist approach
to resolve that question. See Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 184 (“It is against this legislative
background that we must measure TVA’s claim that the Act was not intended to stop operation of a
project which, like Tellico Dam, was near completion when an endangered species was discovered in
its path. While there is no discussion in the legislative history of precisely this problem, the totality
of congressional action makes it abundantly clear that the result we reach today is wholly in accord
with both the words of the statute and the intent of Congress.”).
104. 437 U.S. at 184. Parsing the legislative history closely, the Court wrote that “the repeated
expressions of congressional concern over what it saw as the potentially enormous danger presented
by the eradication of any endangered species suggest how the balance would have been struck had the
issue been presented to Congress in 1973.” Id. at 186.
105. 515 U.S. at 696–97.
106. Id. at 698 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)).
107. Id. at 699–700 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
109. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
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“[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’
wet or otherwise, as ‘waters,’” the Court ultimately upheld the agency’s regulations.110 The Court supported its conclusion by focusing on the enacted
purposes provision of the law, which indicated that Congress intended “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
[n]ation’s waters.”111 The Court interpreted the enacted purposes provision to
“incorporate[] a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality,” which justified the regulation of adjacent wetlands, since
“[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles” and “[t]he regulation of activities that
cause water pollution . . . must focus on all waters that together form the entire
aquatic system.”112
B. The Shift to Textualism and the Focus on Secondary Purposes
While federal courts frequently examined the purposes of the federal environmental laws to interpret their meaning over the first few decades after
their enactment, there has been a significant shift from purposivism towards
textualism as the predominant method of statutory interpretation adopted by
federal courts over the last few decades.113 The purposivist approach to statutory interpretation grew out of the “legal process” movement of the 1950s

110. Id. at 132–35.
111. Id. at 132 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251).
112. Id. at 132–34 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (July 19, 1977)).
113. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1785–87; John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (arguing that the rejection of textualism
“will not lead to rigid and literal interpretive methods”); see also VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS AND TRENDS 10–16 (2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45153 (“The two predominant theories of statutory interpretation today are purposivism and textualism.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9–10 (1994); David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97, 115–17 (2013) [hereinafter Driesen, Purposeless Construction] (“The modern
Court . . . avoids giving purpose any weight in cases where not even its most aggressive textualists
squarely claim that the statute’s ‘plain meaning’ provides useful guidance.”); Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357 (1994) (“[T]here can
be no doubt that textualism has asserted a powerful hold over the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence.”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2006) (describing the rise of textualism and arguing for a new approach that reconciles textualism
and purposivism); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149,
183 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s more recent approach finds “that clear statutory text is all-butconclusive evidence of legislative intent”).
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and ’60s, championed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, among others.114 In
purposivism, the interpreter resolves ambiguities in statutory language by
identifying the statute’s purpose and interpreting the statute in the manner that
best advances that purpose.115 Adherents of purposivism have traditionally
been willing to examine the legislative history of statutes to assist in identifying the purposes of the statutes.116 Importantly, though, purposivist interpreters will not adopt interpretations of statutes that conflict with the plain meaning of statutes.117 Over the last few decades, a “new purposivism” has
evolved, in which the interpreter relies much more heavily on enacted purposes provisions and other statutory text, rather than legislative history and
other contextual clues, to discern a statute’s purposes.118
114. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 296.
115. Id.; HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 876 (2015) [hereinafter Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch] (urging that
agencies have greater legislative knowledge than courts); see also BRANNON, supra note 113, at 11–
12 (explaining that purposivists argue interpreters should construe statutes to execute their legislative
purpose).
116 See BRANNON, supra note 113, at 13 (“Purposivists are more willing than textualists to consider legislative history.”).
117. See BRANNON, supra note 113, at 12–13; Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra
note 115, at 876; HART & SACKS, supra note 115, at 1378.
118. See Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 879–80, 929–30; see also
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275 (2020) (discussing the “new purposivism” that has emerged in today’s Court); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 113, 132 (2011) (“[T]he Court now takes its cues directly from Congress about how and to what
degree to take background purpose or policy into account.”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 362 (2012) [hereinafter Stack, Interpreting Regulations] (arguing in
favor of a “regulatory purposivism” that gives greater weight to statements of purpose in judicial interpretation); Note, The Rise of Purposivism and the Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the
Supreme Court, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2017) [hereinafter The Rise of Purposivism] (discussing that there is “a new brand of purposivism that places greater weight on the text’s semantic meaning”). Critics of purposivism often argue that the approach inappropriately assumes that Congress acts
with specific purposes in mind or that the traditional approach provides judges with too much discretion to identify purposes of a statute in a way that supports their preferred interpretation. See
BRANNON, supra note 113, at 13; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18 (2012); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
VA. L. REV. 419, 430 (2005) (asserting that textualists do care about legislative intent); Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 879–80. Professor Kevin Stack argues that the
focus in new purposivism on enacted purposes provisions in statutes and the text of statutes is actually
at the heart of Hart and Sacks’s earlier theories. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22,
at 296. The new purposivism narrows the gap between textualism and purposivism. See BRANNON,
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Purposivism has been significantly supplanted as a method of statutory
interpretation over the years by textualism.119 Textualists focus on the words
of a statute—rather than the purposes, legislative history, or evidence of the
history of enactment—to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous language in the
statute.120 Textualists focus on the ordinary meaning of words (or, in some
cases, dictionary meaning), rules of grammar or similar canons of construction, and the context in which the language in question is used in the statute
or in similar statutes.121 Occasionally, textualists will examine enacted purposes provisions of statutes to aid in interpreting ambiguous language since
the provisions are enacted as text within the statute.122
While the trend toward textualism predominates across all types of statutes, Professors Robert Glicksman and Christopher Schroeder documented
the shift in a study of judicial review of environmental laws almost three decades ago.123 In their study, Glicksman and Schroeder analyzed the decisions
of federal courts reviewing actions by EPA over the first twenty years of the
agency’s existence.124 They concluded that the courts aggressively reviewed
the agency’s actions during the early years of the agency, interpreting the environmental statutes according to their broad purposes and declining to accord
deference to the agency.125 However, by the end of the study period, they
concluded that the courts adopted a more deferential view toward EPA’s decisionmaking and focused less on the purposes of the statutes in review of the
agency’s decisions.126 They hypothesized that the change was based on several factors, including a change in the judicial attitude toward agencies after
supra note 113, at 16; Molot, supra note 113, at 3; Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New
Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2028, 2030–31 (2005) (“The shift from focusing on dictionaries to
ordinary usage should be seen as an additional step toward reconciling textualist methodology with
the goal of providing an interpretation that reflects a statute’s purpose.”).
119. See Driesen, Purposeless Construction, supra note 113, at 111–12 (“As many commentators
have noted, the Court became increasingly textualist, purporting to resolve cases by discovering directly applicable provisions’ ‘plain meaning,’ often with no resort to statutory purpose at all.”).
120. See BRANNON, supra note 113, at 13–14; Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra
note 115, at 881.
121. See BRANNON, supra note 113, at 13–15.
122. Id. at 13–14.
123. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law
and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1991).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 249, 256.
126. Id. at 249, 256–57.
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. NRDC.127 They followed up their
initial study with an empirical study of all of the federal circuit court cases
decided between 1991 and 1999 in which EPA or the EPA Administrator appeared as a party.128 Based on their review of the cases, they concluded that
courts were continuing to defer more frequently to agencies and that courts
were relying more heavily on textualism and less frequently on nontextual
tools, including legislative history, during the study period.129
Recent analyses of judicial interpretation of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act over time confirm the prevalence of the trend from purposivism to
textualism in the context of judicial review of the federal environmental
laws.130 David Driesen, Thomas Keck, and Brandon Metroka demonstrated
the trend in the Clean Air Act context when they reviewed the twenty cases
decided by the Supreme Court interpreting the Act over a half century.131 Professor Driesen and his colleagues found that during the 1970s the Court
“tended to follow statutory purpose”:
[It] freely relied upon structure and legislative history . . . .
And the Court only acted contrary to statutory purpose
where specific text or a constitutional value pushed in that
direction. . . . Purposivism seems to have led the Court to
decisions that often followed the [Clean Air Act’s] philosophy.132
Driesen and his colleagues found that as the Burger Court shifted to the

127. Id. at 256, 295 (noting how “the centerpiece of this recent shift in judicial emphasis” has been
the Chevron test).
128. See Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm and the EPA in
the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,371 (2001).
They also reviewed a sampling of cases decided in the federal circuit courts in which EPA or the EPA
Administrator was a party, in order to compare the decisionmaking over time. Id. at 10,372.
129. Id. at 10,372, 10,390–91. They found that in the 1990s courts used textual analyses of the plain
meaning of statutes in 88% of the cases and examined legislative history in only 33% of the cases. Id.
at 10,390–91.
130. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1785, 1787 (addressing how statutory
interpretation of the Clean Air Act has shifted from purposovism to textualism).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1807, 1810.
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Rehnquist Court it “turned to textualism”133 and that many of the decisions in
the 1980s were in tension with the policies of the statute.134 Finally, during
the era of Justice Roberts, Driesen concluded that the Court adopted a dynamic method of interpreting the statute that was not based on purpose or text
but on ideology.135
Inspired by the work of Professor Driesen and his colleagues, the author
of this Article reviewed the thirty opinions that the Supreme Court issued over
the last half century that focused on statutory interpretation questions under
the Clean Water Act.136 As with the Driesen study, the review demonstrated
a significant shift towards textualism over the study period.137 While the
Court supported its decisions during the Burger era with citations to the Clean
Water Act’s purposes in nine of the thirteen cases interpreting the statute, the
Court only cited the law’s purposes in three of the ten cases decided during
the Roberts era.138 In addition, while the Burger and Rehnquist Courts frequently attempted to justify decisions that departed from the water quality
protection goals of the Clean Water Act by citing clear statement canons or
arguing that the decisions were somehow consistent with statutory purposes,
the Roberts Court simply ignored the purposes of the statute in its opinions
and did not seem to feel compelled to justify the departure from the statute’s
goals.139 The review of the Court’s Clean Water Act opinions also demonstrated that the Court drastically reduced its reliance on legislative history over
the study period.140
The review of the Court’s Clean Water Act opinions identified another
disturbing trend in judicial review, at least under that statute.141 While the
Burger Court frequently cited the water quality protection purposes of the statute to support its decisions, to the extent that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have discussed the purposes of the statute in interpreting the statute, they have
133. Id. at 1819, 1824–25.
134. Id. at 1810.
135. Id. at 1835–42.
136. See Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11.
137. Id. at 362, 376–77.
138. Id. at 377–78.
139. Id. at 381–82.
140. Id. at 362, 376–77. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts cited legislative history in fifteen
of the twenty cases decided during those Terms, the Roberts Court cited legislative history in only two
of the ten cases decided during the Term. Id. at 377–78.
141. See Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 362, 376, 379–82.
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increasingly cited the secondary goal of the law to protect states’ rights, even
when the Court’s interpretation seems to conflict with the primary goal of the
statute to protect water quality.142
C. Increased Focus on Costs in Interpreting the Federal Environmental
Laws
As the federal courts have de-emphasized the focus on the health and environmental protection purposes of the federal environmental statutes when
interpreting them, they have increased their willingness to interpret the statutes in a manner that authorizes the consideration of costs in implementation
of the statutes.143 Professor Driesen and his colleagues noted this shift in their
review of the Supreme Court’s Clean Air Act cases, finding that the Court’s
recent decisions embody a dynamic interpretation of the law to incorporate
cost-benefit analysis, based primarily on ideological considerations.144
Congress frequently identified broad health and safety purposes for the
federal environmental laws and none of the major laws discussed at the outset
of this Article explicitly authorizes or requires agencies to engage in costbenefit analysis.145 In fact, provisions in the Clean Air Act and Endangered
Species Act prohibit consideration of costs for various types of
142. See id. Other than a footnote in one opinion, in every case in which the Burger Court discussed
the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the Court focused on the water quality goals of Section 101(a).
Id. at 379 (discussing the Court’s treatment of the Clean Water Act Section 101(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)). However, during the Rehnquist era, the Court cited Section 101(b), the states’ rights provision, in almost as many cases as the Court cited the water quality goals of Section 101(a). Id. at
380–81. Finally, though, to the extent that the Roberts Court has focused on the water quality goals
of Section 101(a), it has only done so when the interpretation of the law also advances the policies of
Section 101(b), and the Court has routinely stressed the importance of both provisions in interpreting
the law. Id. at 381.
143. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1787, 1837 (discussing the increased willingness to consider cost in implementation of statutes).
144. See Driesen et al., Half a Century, supra note 10, at 1835–42.
145. See Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Nothing Analysis: Environmental Economics in the Age of Trump,
30 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 287, 288 (2019) (providing an economic analysis of
environmental policy and concluding cost-benefit analysis “dominate[s] federal environmental policy”); Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, The Ascendancy of the Cost-Benefit State?, 5 ADMIN. L. REV.
ACCORD 85, 114 (2020) (noting that, of the ten major federal environmental laws enacted in the 1970s
and ’80s, only the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) contain provisions that require cost-benefit analysis). An amendment to
the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1996 added a cost-benefit analysis requirement as well. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)–(iii).
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decisionmaking.146 The technology-forcing provisions of many of the laws
also seem to de-emphasize cost considerations.147 However, outside of those
examples, the laws are frequently silent or ambiguous regarding whether the
federal government should consider the costs imposed by the laws when interpreting and implementing them.148
For many decades following the enactment of the federal environmental
laws, federal courts adopted something akin to a presumption against consideration of costs in interpreting those laws.149 Prior to 2009, courts frequently
held that agencies should not use cost-benefit analysis in decisionmaking under the environmental laws unless the laws clearly authorized that balancing.150 However, the Executive Branch routinely utilized cost-benefit analysis
for decisionmaking under those laws,151 and the trend in the federal courts
eventually shifted.152
In 2009, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc.,153 the Supreme Court held
that it was appropriate for EPA to consider cost in setting standards for cooling
water intake structures based on “the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact[s]” even though the Clean Water Act did not

146. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 114–15 (citing Section 109 of the Clean Air Act and
Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act) (listing endangered or threatened species); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1664 (2001) (stating that “the national ambient air quality standards set under [the Clean Air] Act have been understood to be based
on ‘public health’ alone”).
147. See Sunstein, supra note 146, at 1656–57.
148. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 115.
149. Id. at 86.
150. Id. at 85–86. Noe and Graham cite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490 (1980), and Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), as examples of the Supreme Court “presumption” against cost-benefit analysis. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 95.
In Whitman, the Court emphasized that the challengers “must show a textual commitment of authority
to the EPA to consider costs in setting [national ambient air quality standards]” and “that textual commitment must be a clear one.” 531 U.S. at 468. “Congress . . . does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.” Id.
151. See Heinzerling, supra note 145, at 290–91.
152. See Aaron Sanders, Decades of Uncertainty End with Error, 17 MO. ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.
588, 594–97 (2010) (illustrating the shift in the Court when it “held that ‘it was well within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis was not categorically
forbidden’” (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 209 (2009))).
153. 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
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explicitly authorize the agency to consider costs in setting the standards.154
The Court held that Congress’s silence regarding the consideration of costs
was “meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands
as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used.”155 Six years later, the
Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA,156 a case that focused on EPA’s
refusal to consider cost in deciding whether it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate hazardous air pollutants from power plants.157 While the
statute did not explicitly require EPA to consider cost in deciding whether to
regulate the hazardous air pollutants, the Court held that cost is a relevant
factor to be considered in determining whether regulation is “appropriate and
necessary” and determined that the agency acted arbitrarily by failing to consider cost.158 After Entergy and Michigan, several commentators have suggested that the Court has established a presumption in favor of interpreting
statutes to authorize consideration of cost unless statutes explicitly prohibit
such consideration.159 Some academics are even calling on the Executive
Branch to adopt an approach to statutory interpretation that always considers
cost unless statutes explicitly prohibit consideration of cost.160
154. See id. at 217–18 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)). EPA set the standards based on the use of costbenefit analysis. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 122–25 (2004).
155. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 222–23.
156. 576 U.S. 743 (2015).
157. Id. at 743–44.
158. Id. at 751–57. To the extent that the earlier Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457 (2001), decision appeared to create a presumption against considering cost unless Congress explicitly authorized consideration of cost, the Michigan Court indicated that Whitman “establishe[d] the
modest principle that where the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor
that on its face does not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly allowing the
Agency to consider cost anyway.” Id. at 756–57.
159. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 85–86, 95; Heinzerling, supra note 145, at 291–92
(noting the broad reach of the Michigan Court’s decision in light of the fact that the term “appropriate”
appears more than 10,000 times in the U.S. Code).
160. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 112–13. The call was sounded by John Graham, former
Administrator in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Id. at 85. OIRA oversees federal agencies’ compliance with executive
orders, including those requiring cost-benefit analysis. See Information and Regulatory Affairs,
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ (last visited Dec.
26, 2021). Graham asserts that, following the decisions in Entergy, Michigan, and their progeny, “all
agencies, including independent agencies, should reinterpret their statutes to require benefit-cost balancing, unless clearly prohibited by statute.” Id. at 87. Further, he argues that the President should
issue an executive order that requires agencies to reinterpret their statutes along those lines and precludes agencies from adopting regulations that do not follow that approach. Id.

311

[Vol. 49: 285, 2022]

Whither the Lofty Goals
of the Environmental Laws
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

To the extent that courts move toward default rules of statutory interpretation that permit the consideration of costs unless explicitly prohibited, courts
will be more likely to interpret the federal environmental statutes in ways that
do not advance the health and environmental protection purposes of those statutes.161 As many critics have noted, in practice cost-benefit analysis disfavors
environmental protection in many important ways.162 Professor Lisa Heinzerling notes that cost-benefit analysis often fails to advance environmental
protection goals because it requires agencies to balance costs of agency regulation against environmental and health benefits—which frequently cannot be
quantified or monetized, so are not adequately considered in cost-benefit balancing.163 She also points out that cost-benefit analysis greatly discounts the
value of benefits of policies that reduce future harms, which is what most environmental policies attempt to achieve.164 Therefore, if courts increasingly

161. See Noe & Graham, supra note 145, at 111–14.
162. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, The Missing Element of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis: Compensation for the Loss of Regulatory Benefits, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 281 (2018) (recommending
people affected by environmental harms be considered in the cost-benefit analysis); Shi-Ling Hsu, The
Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433 (2008) (noting there are more
important considerations than monetary concerns when evaluating environmental laws); Amy Sinden,
In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1405 (2005) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis does not fix the power imbalance that causes environmental issues); Heinzerling, supra note 145, at 292–97.
163. See Heinzerling, supra note 145, at 293–97. Heinzerling notes that many water pollution and
toxic substances rules are sidelined by cost-benefit analysis because it is difficult to quantify and monetize their benefits. Id. at 296–97. She notes that the one area where cost-benefit balancing has not
adversely affected environmental rulemaking is in the air pollution area, where many of the rules
adopted by EPA target particulate pollution to some extent, and particulate pollution can be quantified
and monetized. Id. at 296. As Heinzerling notes, “[p]articulate matter kills people, in significant
numbers.” Id. At the end of his Administration, President Trump took steps to make it more difficult
for EPA to justify regulating pollutants under the Clean Air Act by adopting a regulation that imposes
additional limits on the agency’s consideration of environmental benefits of air pollution rules. See
40 C.F.R. § 83 (2020). Critics argue that the rule could prevent EPA from considering important
indirect benefits of rules and cause the agency to disproportionately underestimate benefits of a rule.
See Melissa Horne, Mack McGuffey & Mandi Moroz, EPA Promulgates Final Cost-Benefit Analysis
Rule for Clean Air Act Regulations, JD SUPRA (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/epa-promulgates-final-cost-benefit-6479987/.
164. See Heinzerling, supra note 145, at 297. Professor Heinzerling also criticizes cost-benefit
analysis because it implements a policy that prioritizes efficiency over fairness. Id. at 292. As she
notes, cost-benefit analysis implements “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency, which provides that a decision is
efficient “if the winners in the decision come out far enough ahead that they could compensate the
losers[, but] . . . the winners need not actually compensate the losers . . . [so the method] shunts fairness
to the side in its pursuit of overall wealth.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
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interpret the federal environmental statutes to authorize cost-benefit analysis,
it is likely that the statutes will be interpreted in ways that do not advance the
health and environmental protection purposes of the statutes.
D. No End in Sight
The trends in federal courts toward textualism and consideration of costs
in interpreting ambiguous provisions of regulatory statutes are likely to continue or accelerate in light of the unprecedented number of judges that were
appointed by President Trump.165 In four years, former President Trump filled
almost 30% of the positions on the federal appellate and trial courts and three
of the nine seats on the Supreme Court.166 The President coordinated his nominations with the Federalist Society, and most of the judges appointed during
his tenure were members of the Society, which advocates for textualist interpretation of statutes and limited government regulation.167
165. See John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/. It
is unlikely that President Biden will be able to do much to reverse that trend through judicial appointments, as every seat on the federal courts of appeals was full until Justice Amy Coney Barrett was
elevated from the Seventh Circuit to the Supreme Court. See Madison Alder, Georgia Opens Path for
Bold Push on Judges—If Biden Wants It, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2021, 12:54 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/georgia-opens-path-for-bold-push-on-judges-if-bidenwants-it. As of March 22, 2021, there were only seven vacancies out of 179 positions on the federal
appellate courts and sixty-one vacancies out of 677 positions on the federal district courts. See Judicial
Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (Dec. 26,
2021). Biden is also unlikely to be able to significantly impact the direction of the Supreme Court
jurisprudence, as President Trump’s three Supreme Court nominees were all fifty-five or younger
when they were nominated, and a Pew Research Center study in 2017 found that justices who were
appointed to the Supreme Court when they were fifty-five or younger generally served for an average
of almost twenty years. See Gramlich, supra.
166. See Gramlich, supra note 165 (finding that Trump appointed 30% of appellate judges and 27%
of trial judges); Ann E. Marimow & Matt Viser, Biden Moves Quickly To Make His Mark on Federal
Courts After Trump’s Record Judicial Nominations, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/biden-judge-nominations/2021/02/02/e9932f3a6189-11eb-9430-e7c77b5b0297_story.html.
167. See Muri Assunção, Analysis of Trump’s Judicial Appointments Finds Nearly 40% of Confirmed Appellate Judges Have Shown Anti-LGBTQ Bias, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 6, 2021, 5:21 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-trump-judicial-appointees-confirmed-appellatejudges-anti-lgbtq-20210106-6pjd33k2hrcdlkp67drx7go3k4-story.html (stating that 85% of Trump’s
circuit court nominees are or were affiliated with the Federalist Society); Marimow & Viser, supra
note 166; Sherman et al., supra note 15; see also About Us, FEDERALIST SOC’Y,
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The trends toward textualism and consideration of costs are at odds with
the strong public support for environmental protection and environmental regulation.168 According to several recent polls, most Americans believe that
stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth their cost169 and that
EPA’s powers should be preserved or expanded.170
IV. THE EROSION OF CHEVRON
The federal judiciary’s approach to statutory interpretation is changing in
another important way that reduces the likelihood that federal courts will interpret environmental laws to advance their health and environmental protection purposes.171 For decades after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,172 federal courts accorded great deference to federal agencies when they
were interpreting statutes, upholding the agencies’ decisions in about 70% or
more of the cases reviewed by scholars.173 To the extent that EPA and other
https://fedsoc.org/about-us (last visited Dec. 26, 2021) (outlining the Federalist Society’s principles);
Senator Ted Cruz, Second Annual Gregory S. Coleman Memorial Lecture, 24 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
283, 286 (2019) (identifying textualism and originalism as founding principles of the Federalist Society).
168. See Kristen Bialik, Most Americans Favor Stricter Environmental Laws and Regulations, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/14/most-americans-favor-stricter-environmental-laws-and-regulations/ (citing a Pew Research survey conducted between
November 30, 2016, and December 5, 2016, in which 59% of respondents indicated that “stricter
environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost”).
169. See id.
170. See Chris Kahn, Unlike Trump, Americans Want Strong Environmental Regulator—Reuters/Ipsos, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-environment-idUSKBN1511DU (citing a Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted between December 16, 2016,
through January 12, 2017, in which “[m]ore than 60[%] of [respondents indicated that they] would
like to see the U.S. [EPA]’s powers preserved or strengthened under . . . President Donald Trump”).
In a separate March 2017 Gallup poll, 56% of respondents indicated that protection of the environment
should be given priority over protection of the economy, 69% of respondents indicated that they favor
“more strongly enforcing federal regulations,” 59% said that the government was doing “too little to
protect the environment,” and 57% said that they thought that the quality of the environment was
getting worse. See Environment, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (last
visited Dec. 26, 2021).
171. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 114–15 (noting that between 2000 and 2016,
federal courts have shifted away from the Chevron deference standard “as judicial and political skepticism toward agencies and the Chevron decision has grown”).
172. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reh’g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
173. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 69–70; see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J.
Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (noting federal circuit courts
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agencies interpret the federal environmental laws to carry out their health and
environmental protection purposes, therefore, Chevron deference increases
the likelihood that courts will uphold those interpretations.174 However, over
the past few decades, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been
creating exceptions to Chevron, agencies have been disavowing reliance on
the doctrine,175 and courts have been increasingly avoiding the use of Chevron
to review agency statutory interpretations.176 In some cases, the Supreme
Court has created exceptions explicitly, as with the “major questions doctrine”
applied most recently in King v. Burwell.177 In many cases, though, the
upheld agency interpretations in 77.4% of Chevron cases decided between 2003 and 2013); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 30–31 (1998) (stating federal agencies prevailed in 73% of Chevron
challenges in federal appellate courts between 1995 and 1996); Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note
128, at 10,376 fig. 1 (highlighting that EPA prevailed in 75.7% of Chevron challenges in federal appellate courts in the 1990s). In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute when the agency adopts that interpretation
through a legislative rule. 467 U.S. at 842–43 (1984). At Step One, the court decides “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. Courts use the “traditional tools
of statutory construction” at Step One. Id. at 843 & n.9. If Congress’s intent is clear, the court interprets the statute in accordance with that intent, but if the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the
interpretive question, the court, at Step Two, defers to the agency’s interpretation of the statute if it is
reasonable. Id. at 843.
174. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 173, at 6. Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker conducted
the most ambitious and comprehensive study of the way federal courts utilize and apply Chevron,
reviewing all of the published decisions from the federal circuit courts between 2003 and 2013 that
refer to the doctrine. Id. at 5. Their study was not limited to review of EPA actions but focused on
review of actions of all federal agencies. Id. at 5, 21. They found that application of Chevron was a
very significant factor in the resolution of the cases, as agencies’ interpretations were upheld in 77.4%
of the cases when Chevron was applied, as opposed to 56% of the cases where Skidmore deference
was applied and 38.5% of cases where the courts applied de novo review. Id. at 6.
175. See Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Agencies during the
Trump Administration disavowed Chevron deference when defending policies adopted by prior Administrations that the agencies had not yet repealed or rescinded. See Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1533–34 (2019) (stating that during the Trump Administration the
FCC did not seek Chevron deference in litigation over an Obama-era rule in Global Tel*Link and that
because the FCC declined to defend its own rule, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule).
176. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 77–78, 80–81 (discussing the erosion of Chevron deference in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, as well as judicial criticism of the doctrine and legislative attempts to rescind it); The Rise of Purposivism, supra note 118, at 1238–43 (discussing the “major questions doctrine” and the Court’s increasing practice of ignoring Chevron
without comment); see also Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s
Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2384 (2013) (noting that federal courts are now “more
sympathetic to conservative, anti-regulatory arguments than progressive ones”).
177. 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015). The Court created the exception in 2000, in FDA v. Brown &
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Supreme Court and lower federal courts simply ignore Chevron without acknowledging the precedent or justifying the decision to ignore it.178 Several
Supreme Court Justices have expressed skepticism of the precedent.179
At the same time that the federal courts are creating Chevron exceptions
or ignoring Chevron, they are deferring less to EPA—in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services180—in cases where they apply Chevron.181 In Brand
X, the Court held that a court should accord an agency Chevron deference
even when an agency’s statutory interpretation conflicts with a prior judicial
interpretation of a statute unless the court, in the prior decision, concluded that
the meaning of the statute was clear and unambiguous.182 Although the decision, on its face, seems like an expansion of deference to agencies, the real
world impact of the decision has been just the opposite.183 The obvious way
for federal courts to maintain the power to interpret statutes after Brand X is
to decide statutory interpretation questions at Chevron Step One when first

Williamson Tobacco Corp., when the Court refused to accord deference to the FDA, noting that there
may be statutory interpretation questions of such significance that “there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress . . . intended” to delegate resolution of the questions to an agency.
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
178. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1124–25
(2008); Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 78 (citing Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft AntiChevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (2018)); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970, 982 (1992) (“[T]he Chevron framework is used in only
about half the cases that the Court perceives as presenting a deference question.”). In their study of
Supreme Court decisions between 1984 and 2006, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer concluded that
the Court applied Chevron deference only about one quarter of the time that it should have been applied. See Eskridge & Baer, supra, at 1131.
179. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 80–81 (discussing the constitutional objections
raised by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas and Justice Breyer’s advocacy for a more contextualized usage
of Chevron); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (expressing
skepticism toward Chevron). Despite these criticisms, it does not appear that a majority of Justices
on the Court would vote to overturn the precedent in the near future. Id.
180. See 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
181. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 67–70 (reviewing federal circuit court decisions
between 2000 and 2016 in which EPA or the EPA Administrator appeared as a party and the courts
were applying Chevron to review the agency’s interpretations and finding that it appears that the
“‘Chevron effect’ . . . is fading after Brand X”).
182. See 545 U.S. at 982–83.
183. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 70 (noting that the rate at which courts affirmed
EPA decisions following Brand X dropped nearly 10%).
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faced with the questions, negating any Chevron deference for agencies if they
reinterpret the statutes after the courts’ decisions.184 Subsequent to Brand X,
that is precisely what has happened, as the federal circuit courts have increasingly decided cases involving Chevron challenges to EPA decisions at Step
One, finding the statutes clear and unambiguous and refusing to defer to the
agency.185 The rate at which federal appellate courts upheld EPA decisions
after Brand X fell by almost 10% compared to the rate at which the courts
upheld those decisions before Brand X.186 As a result of the increase in Chevron exceptions and the decrease in Chevron deference to EPA after Brand X,
federal courts are more aggressively reviewing EPA’s interpretations of the
federal environmental statutes, and they are doing so under the lens of textualism and increased consideration of costs, as noted above.187
Even in cases where federal courts are willing to apply Chevron, traditional Chevron deference might not be sufficient to increase the likelihood
that the federal environmental laws will be interpreted to carry out their health
and environmental protection purposes because EPA and other federal agencies have increasingly been ignoring those purposes in their interpretation and
implementation of the laws for at least the past four years.188
184. See id. at 79 (noting that “if a court finds that a statute is clear [at Chevron Step One], then an
agency cannot subsequently adopt a[] [conflicting] interpretation”).
185. See id. at 69–71.
186. Id. In cases decided between 2000 and 2005, when the Supreme Court issued its Brand X
opinion, federal courts affirmed EPA’s decisions about 76.6% of the time, while in cases decided after
Brand X, the courts upheld EPA’s decisions about 67.5% of the time. Id. at 70. Significantly, while
courts decided about 33% of the challenges at Chevron Step One before Brand X was decided, they
decided almost 50% of the challenges at Step One after Brand X was decided. Id. at 70–71, 106–07.
187. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at 114–15 (noting that circuit courts defer less to
EPA and that the Brand X decision may have motivated circuit courts to interpret statutes at Step One
more aggressively in ways that cannot be changed by agencies). During the era of Chief Justice
Burger, about 40% of the Court’s decisions interpreting the Clean Water Act “could be characterized
as ‘pro-environment’ in the sense that the opinion advance[d] the water quality protection goals of the
[statute] or adopt[ed] a position advocated by environmental groups.” See Johnson, Clean Water Act,
supra note 11, at 385. However, during the Roberts era, only about 20% of the Court’s Clean Water
Act opinions have been “pro-environment.” See id. at 386.
188. See Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 363, 396–97. In the Clean Water Act context,
for instance, EPA has “increasingly emphasized the protection of states’ rights” under Section 101(b),
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), “at the expense of the water quality protection goals of [Section] 101(a).” Id. at
360. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule adopted by EPA, see 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2020), and the
U.S. Army Corps and “EPA’s policy reversal regarding discharges to groundwater in the County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund[, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472–73 (2020),] case are just a few examples of the
agenc[y’]s policy shift.” Id.
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V. UNDERENFORCEMENT AND ASYMMETRIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
At the same time that courts are deferring less to agencies under Chevron
and are aggressively reviewing statutes using textualism instead of purposivism, they continue to defer to agencies when agencies underenforce statutory
requirements.189 Since EPA and other agencies interpreting the federal environmental laws frequently interpret them against their health and environmental protection purposes to provide for exemptions or other relief to regulated
entities, the trend toward deferring to underenforcement makes it more likely
that the federal environmental laws will not be applied and interpreted to carry
out those primary purposes.190
Professor Daniel Walters recently highlighted the asymmetrical approach
taken by federal courts when reviewing statutory interpretation by regulatory
agencies.191 Walters points out that overregulation by an agency, which he
refers to as a “Type I error,” and underregulation by an agency, which he refers to as a “Type II error,”192 are “two sides of the same coin” and are both
Even before the Trump Administration took power, though, there was a significant change in the nature of the actions that the Supreme Court reviewed under
the Clean Water Act . . . . During the early years of the Clean Water Act in the
Burger era, almost half of the cases heard by the Supreme Court involved either
challenges to strict government regulation or limits on challenges to government action . . . . During the Roberts era, most of the Court’s cases involved
challenges to government action that reduced regulatory burdens.
Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 397. In addition, a review of the federal appellate court
decisions between 2000 and 2016 involving challenges to EPA actions reviewed under the Chevron
test indicates that, while EPA was sued nearly as often by regulated entities as it was sued by public
interest groups, the agency was much less successful defending challenges brought by public interest
groups than challenges brought by regulated entities. See Johnson, Brand X Effect, supra note 17, at
71–72. “Those findings should prompt EPA to consider whether it is devoting sufficient attention to
the purposes of the environmental statutes and the issues raised by parties other than regulated entities
during the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Id. at 72. The Endangered Species Act includes a
provision that requires all agencies to use their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of the Endangered Species Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). Perhaps the other federal environmental laws
should include provisions that require agencies to carry out their authorities to further the purposes of
those laws.
189. See Walters, supra note 13.
190. See Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 363 (stating that EPA and U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers have increasingly underenforced the Clean Water Act in deference to states’ rights “at
the expense of the water quality protection goals” stated in the statute).
191. See Walters, supra note 13, at 455.
192. See id. at 458–59. Walters suggests that agencies can err in statutory interpretation through
“interpretive underreach, whether by indefinitely declining to take action prescribed, by disclaiming
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errors in statutory interpretation.193 Until recently, he argues, courts treated
Type I errors and Type II errors similarly, deferring to agencies in both scenarios.194 For Type I errors, courts relied on Chevron to uphold agency overregulation by applying a deferential standard of review to the agencies’ statutory interpretation.195 For Type II errors, in addition to relying on Chevron,196
courts relied on cases like Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance197 and
Heckler v. Chaney198 to defer to Type II errors by finding challenges to such
errors largely unreviewable.199
Walters observes that, as noted above, over time federal courts have begun applying Chevron deference less frequently and that courts are according
agencies less deference when reviewing actions that are challenged as overregulation.200 At the same time, though, he points out that courts have continued to apply Norton, Heckler, and related precedent to limit challenges to
agency actions that result in underenforcement of statutes.201
their authority altogether, or by simply refusing to undertake action in cases where the statutory language is clearly applicable.” Id. at 458. He identifies exemptions, exceptions, exclusions, waivers,
and variances as frequent sources of Type II errors. Id. at 476. In addition, he argues that agency
inaction is “for all practical purposes, an interpretation that the statute does not require that action.”
Id. at 477 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 480 (quoting Eric Bilber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENV’T L.J. 461, 461–62 (2008)). According to Walters, “when
an agency adopts an interpretation of a statute that is overinclusive . . . that overextension is equivalent
in all pertinent respects to an agency’s failure to implement the full meaning anticipated by the enacting Congress.” Id. at 463.
194. Id. at 463, 479. Walters notes that even though the level of deference to agencies has varied
over time, courts historically have generally accorded agencies the same level of deference regardless
of whether they were overregulating or underregulating. Id. at 484.
195. Id. at 463.
196. Id. at 474. Walters notes that Chevron itself involved a Type II error, in that EPA was arguably
underenforcing the Clean Air Act when it interpreted the term “stationary source” to be defined on a
plant-wide basis. Id. at 475. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
197. 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (refusing to hear challenge to Department of Interior’s decision to allow
off-road vehicle use in wilderness areas, based on a finding that to make a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act a plaintiff must assert that an agency failed to take a required discrete action).
198. 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (creating a presumption of nonreviewability for challenges to an
agency’s decision to not bring an enforcement action).
199. See Walters, supra note 13, at 461.
200. Id. at 463–64.
201. Id. at 463–64, 487–88, 490–91, 499. Beyond Norton and Heckler, Walters also observes that
courts continue to refuse to review agencies’ denials of rulemaking petitions. Id. at 493. Walters
asserts that the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), to deny judicial review of agency underenforcement of statutes “may well
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Walters forcefully argues that the asymmetrical treatment of Type I errors
is not justified under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)202 or based on
the challenges that are leveled against overregulation by agencies.203 He also
cogently warns that the asymmetrical treatment of Type I errors and Type II
errors can delegitimize administrative law and sow scorn for the administrative process.204 Ultimately, he argues that symmetry in the treatment of both
types of errors is required and that deference in both situations is preferred.205
The agency trend to underenforce regulatory statutes that Professor Walters examined is part of a larger problem that was identified by Professor Walters, along with Professors Cary Coglianese and Gabriel Scheffler.206 In a
be the judicial practice most at odds with the trend against deference in other contexts.” See id. at 498.
In response to the trend, Walters complains that “[i]f statutes are binding directives, and if Congress
has a definite judicially determinable meaning when it speaks through legislation, there is no valueneutral reason to believe that errors of addition are more or less excusable than errors of omission.”
Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
202. Id. at 482–83. Walters points out that the APA defines “action” to include a “failure to act”
and that the statute “creates a cause of action for parties aggrieved when an agency ‘unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed’ action.” Id. at 479–80.
203. See id. at 460–61, 475. Regarding Justice Thomas’s concern in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.
743 (2015), that deference “wrests from [the] [c]ourts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what
the law is’ . . . and hands it over to the Executive,” id. at 761, Walters argues that Thomas’s concern
would seem to apply with equal force when executive agencies exploit statutory
imprecision to avoid taking actions consistent with the judiciary’s best understanding of the statute’s directive. Operating on these formalist foundations,
the meaning of a statute just is what it is[;] . . . it is not conventionally understood to be only a ceiling.
Id. at 460 (footnote omitted). Walters observes that the asymmetry in judicial review of Type I and
Type II errors “imports a libertarian default rule into administrative law, preventing judges from holding agencies to Congress’s expectation of policy implementation while simultaneously empowering
courts to stop agencies whenever the latter’s activities move beyond what Congress has mandated.”
Id. at 461. He also notes that while criticisms of deference to agency decisionmaking often focus on
concern with agency overregulation, Type II errors by agencies are likely far more pervasive. Id. at
475.
204. Id. at 461–62. Walters notes:
While administrative law has at times been subject to criticism for asymmetrically distributing outcomes in favor of regulated entities, a one-sided rethinking
of deference (i.e., one that only benefits regulated entities seeking to curtail
Type I errors and turns a cold shoulder to regulatory beneficiaries who would
like to eliminate Type II errors that prevent the delivery of those benefits) would
be a substantial escalation of polarization in regulatory policymaking.
Id. at 512 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 462–63, 465–66.
206. See Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler & Daniel E. Walters, Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. 885
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recent article, they called attention to the increasing use of agency “unrules,”
which encompass individual waivers, exemptions, and variances, as well as
industry-wide carveouts and exemptions, including “grandfathering” existing
industry members out of new regulatory requirements.207 Professor
Coglianese and his associates note that the APA and regulatory statutes frequently authorize agencies to adopt such unrules without following many of
the procedures that agencies usually follow when imposing burdens on regulated entities.208 Frequently, the unrules are adopted in a manner that prevents
members of the public from discovering that the unrules relieve specific
groups from the otherwise applicable regulatory requirements.209 Professor
Coglianese and his associates also criticize the practice of courts imposing
barriers to review of unrules and applying a less demanding standard of judicial review to unrules.210 Accordingly, they warn that agency proliferation of
unrules “undermine[s] important health and safety protections [in laws], enable[s] regulatory capture, and threaten[s] the rule of law.”211 To address these
concerns, they recommend that agencies should be required to follow
(2021) (stating that “unrules” limit the scope of a regulatory obligation”).
207. Id. at 888–89. The authors note that the invasion of zebra mussels and other non-native species
in the Great Lakes stems, in large part, from an EPA water-pollution unrule that allowed tankers to
discharge ballast water. Id. at 890. They argue that the debate over government regulation frequently
focuses on the government’s power to impose obligations and ignores its power to alleviate those
obligations. Id. While the article focuses primarily on the problems created by unrules, the authors
acknowledge that the devices provide flexibility to minimize burdens on regulated entities and undesirable side effects, encourage technological innovation, and enable regulators to conserve limited
resources. Id. at 909–10.
208. Id. at 941–43. Coglianese and his colleagues note that when an agency adopts an underinclusive rule that imposes burdens on some segment of the regulated community but not others, the agency
is not required to provide public notice that it is not subjecting the other segment of the regulated
community to the burdens. Id. at 943. Similarly, if an agency initially proposes to impose burdens on
a segment of the regulated community in a rulemaking and decides, at the end of the rulemaking
process, to exempt that segment from the requirements, the exemption will usually be held to be a
“logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule, so that the agency need not solicit additional public input
before exempting the segment from regulation. Id. at 943–44. The authors also note that agencies’
rules that impose obligations on regulated entities exceeding $100 million in costs need to be reviewed
by the White House Office of Management and Budget, while rules that decrease the obligations on
those entities are not subject to such review. Id. at 944–45.
209. Id. at 941–43.
210. Id. at 952–59. The authors identify standing doctrine, limits on financial resources, and transaction costs that limit collective action as barriers to challenges to unrules that might be brought by
regulatory beneficiaries. Id.
211. Id. at 893.

321

[Vol. 49: 285, 2022]

Whither the Lofty Goals
of the Environmental Laws
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

additional procedures when adopting unrules in order to make the effect of
the agencies’ deregulatory actions more transparent and to allow the public to
play a greater role in the agencies’ decisionmaking processes.212
Despite these calls for reform, federal courts continue to limit judicial review of agency unrules and Type II errors and to accord agencies deference if
they review those actions.213 That trend, like the trend away from Chevron
deference and the trend away from purposivism, increases the likelihood that
the federal environmental laws will not be interpreted and administered to
achieve their health and environmental purposes unless measures are taken to
counter those trends.214
VI. STATUTORY DIRECTIVES: THE PROPOSAL
There is a tool that could rejuvenate the federal environmental laws and
transform the nature of judicial review of those laws if there is political will
to recommit to the purposes of those laws.215 Congress could refocus judicial
review of agency actions under the federal environmental laws by enacting
statutory directives that require the laws to be interpreted to carry out their
public health and environmental protection purposes.216
A statutory directive is a provision enacted by a legislature that clearly

212. Id. at 959–64.
213. See generally id. at 952–59 (discussing judicial oversight of unrules).
214. See Johnson, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 363.
215. See Caleb Nelson & Kermit Roosevelt, Common Interpretation: The Supremacy Clause,
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/articlevi/clauses/31 (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (discussing statutory directives).
216. See id. (“As long as the directives that Congress enacts are indeed authorized by the Constitution, they take priority over both the ordinary laws and the constitution of each individual state.”). For
instance, an “interpretation clause” could be added to the Clean Water Act mandating, “The provisions
in this chapter shall be interpreted and applied to advance the objectives identified in section 101(a).”
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401; cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (“All other [f]ederal agencies shall .
. . utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for
the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this
title.”). Similarly, the Clean Air Act could be amended to include an “interpretation clause” that requires, “The provisions in this chapter shall be interpreted and applied to advance the purposes identified in section 101(b)(1).” See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401; cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). The
RCRA amendment would refer to the “objectives identified in section 1003(a),” and the Endangered
Species Act amendment would refer to the “purposes identified in section 2(b).” See Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901; cf. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
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indicates to courts the legislature’s intentions regarding how a statute or provisions in the statute should be interpreted.217 State legislatures have frequently enacted canons of construction or entire codes of construction,218 and
Congress has incorporated guidance for statutory interpretation in the Dictionary Act219 and many other laws.220 Several academics have advocated more
broadly for establishment of uniform rules of statutory construction at the federal level, either through a code of construction or other means.221
The proposal in this Article is more modest and simply targets the Clean
Air Act, Clean Water Act, RCRA, the Endangered Species Act, and the Superfund law.222 Congress could reinvigorate those laws by enacting, in a single law or in five separate laws, amendments to each law providing that the
law should be interpreted to carry out the public health and environmental
purposes outlined in the enacted purposes sections of the statutes.223 The
amendment could clarify that those purposes are the primary purposes of the
statute and that, to the extent that there is a conflict between those purposes
and secondary purposes of the statutes, such as protection of state authority,
217. See Jellum, supra note 32, at 847; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 153 (1990) (noting that when there are express legislative instructions about interpretation, “there can be no objection to judicial use of the
relevant instructions”).
218. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2089–90 n.10 (noting that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have interpretive codes and citing many of the statutory provisions); Glen Staszewski, The
Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 217 (2015) (criticizing the simplification of statutory interpretation); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1786 (2010)
(offering a study of state courts’ statutory interpretation).
219. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
220. See Staszewski, supra note 218, at 217 (citing the Dictionary Act and noting that “the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 explicitly limits the material that can be used as legislative history [to interpret]
the statute”); Rosenkrantz, supra note 31, at 2088.
221. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 31, at 2089 (advocating for “Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation”); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 333 (2004) (advocating for a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation).
222. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 88–95 (outlining the enacted purposes provisions of each of the statutes) and
216 (identifying proposed language for the directives). As the Superfund law does not include an
enacted purposes provision, a statutory directive for the Superfund law would need to provide that the
law should be interpreted to protect public health and the environment, rather than referencing purposes already included in an enacted purposes provision. See supra note 94 and accompanying text;
cf. Jellum, supra note 32, at 848 (“Interpretive directives are more diverse. These directives tell judges
how to interpret . . . a particular statute.”).
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Congress intended that courts give priority to the public health and environmental protection purposes of the laws.224
Statutory directives in the federal environmental laws could counter the
trend away from purposivism to textualism in the federal courts because the
directives would provide clear textual guidance for the courts to use in interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutes. Judges would not be interpreting
the environmental statutes to achieve public health and environmental protection purposes because they adopted a purposivist theory of statutory interpretation. Instead, textualist judges would need to interpret the statutes to achieve
public health and environmental protection purposes because the text of the
statute directs that the statute should be interpreted in that manner.225
Statutory directives could also reduce the effect of the shift away from
Chevron deference because judges who would otherwise ignore Chevron in
order to interpret statutes without regard to agency interpretations would be
required, by the text of the statute, to interpret the statute to carry out its enacted purposes.226
It is not clear, though, that statutory directives would address the problems caused by the asymmetric judicial review of overregulation as opposed
to underregulation.227 If challengers to agencies’ underregulation were able
224. See supra text accompanying note 95. In light of the recent trend in federal agencies to interpret and administer the federal environmental laws in ways that seem to conflict with the purposes of
those laws, it might be necessary to include, with the statutory directives, amendments similar to Section 7(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act that require agencies to administer the laws to further their
purposes. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (“All other [f]ederal agencies shall . . . utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to [S]ection 1533 of this title.”) (emphasis added).
On the other hand, the statutory directive, in and of itself, may provide sufficient direction to the
agency that additional legislative mandates are not required. See Jellum, supra note 32, at 848 (“[Statutory] directives [can] tell judges how to interpret either all statutes or a particular statute.”). The
desirability of such additional legislative mandates is an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article.
225. See Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 924; Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 285–86, 306, 308, 314–15 (suggesting that an enacted purposes canon
exists which already requires textualist judges to interpret statutes in accordance with enacted purposes
provisions of the statutes).
226. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”). Similarly, judges who applied Chevron would be required, at Step
One, to use the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including examination of the statutory directive, to decide whether Congress clearly addressed the precise question at issue in the case. See id.
227. See discussion supra Part V (discussing the ramifications of asymmetrical treatment of Type I
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to convince a court to hear the merits of their challenges, courts would have a
harder time dismissing the challenges, as the statutes would require courts to
interpret the laws to protect public health and the environment.228 However,
as noted above, courts frequently use a variety of tools to dismiss challenges
to underregulation on procedural grounds, and statutory directives would not
prevent courts from continuing to follow those approaches.229
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSAL AND THE
INADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVES
The proposal in this Article was inspired by the much more ambitious
proposal of Nicholas Rosenkranz, who has advocated for the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation through a process similar to the process used to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure.230
Rosenkranz, like many, criticized the cacophony that exists in judicial interpretation of statutes,231 where there is “no intelligible, generally accepted, and
errors and Type II errors leading to delegitimization of administrative law).
228. See Jellum, supra note 32, at 893.
229. See id. To the extent that courts rely on Norton, Heckler, and similar precedent to dismiss
challenges to an agency’s failure to take acts under the statutes that they are authorized to take, but not
required to take, to protect public health and the environment, even a legislative amendment that requires agencies to interpret and administer the federal environmental laws to carry out their public
health and environmental protection purposes is unlikely to prevent courts from dismissing those challenges. Such a statutory provision would probably be interpreted as requiring agencies to administer
the laws to carry out public health and environmental purposes when the agencies act under the laws
but would probably not be interpreted to require agencies to take affirmative actions to protect public
health and the environment in cases where they have been given discretion to decide whether to act at
all. See supra notes 192–94, 198.
230. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were created through procedures in both the judicial and legislative branches, and
Rosenkranz proposes a similar process for creation of the Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation.
Id. at 2089, 2151–53.
231. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2088; O’Connor, supra note 221, at 334. Advocating for
the creation of a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation, Gary O’Connor analogizes judicial rules of
statutory interpretation to common law but argues that there are currently no treatises or other traditional tools, like Restatements, available to foster uniformity in statutory interpretation. See O’Connor, supra note 221, at 335–44. However, some commentators suggest that consensus methods of
statutory interpretation are developing and that an influential book authored by Justice Antonin Scalia
and Brian Garner could serve as a de facto treatise on interpreting statutes. See Lawrence M. Solan,
Is It Time for a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 733 (2014) [hereinafter
Solan, Is It Time] (identifying and rejecting those assertions); Gluck, supra note 218 (describing the
consensus on statutory interpretation methodologies in state courts).
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consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”232 Rosenkranz and
others argue that the lack of uniformity makes it difficult to predict how courts
will interpret statutes and gives courts too much discretion to interpret statutes
in ways that are based on personal preferences rather than legislative preferences.233 In light of those limitations, Rosenkranz proposed the creation of a
uniform set of statutory interpretation rules to be applied in federal and state
courts when interpreting federal statutes.234
Many scholars have asserted that only courts—not legislatures—have the
power to define binding rules of statutory interpretation.235 Critics of legislatively created rules of interpretation often argue that such rules violate separation of powers principles, as statutory interpretation is a judicial function
and cannot be usurped by the legislature.236 Critics also argue that courts,
232. See HART & SACKS, supra note 115, at 1169.
233. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2141–42. Even though courts frequently apply canons of
construction to interpret statutes, Karl Llewellyn famously illustrated decades ago that most canons
have a counter-canon that could be argued to apply in similar circumstances to suggest a different
interpretation of the statute than the interpretation suggested by the primary canon. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (commenting on doctrinal interpretation).
Rosenkranz and others argue that the ad hoc application of such canons allows judges to assert authority for whatever interpretation aligns with their policy preferences. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at
2143; Solan, Is It Time, supra note 231, at 743–47.
234. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2088. He, and others, argue that legislative action is required
because courts will not adopt a uniform, coherent approach to statutory interpretation on their own.
Id. Rosenkranz cites the “interpretive regime” outlined by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey in
Law as Equilibrium as inspiration for their federal rules of statutory interpretation. Id. at 2141 (“An
interpretive regime is a system of background norms and conventions against which the Court will
read statutes. An interpretive regime tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings of
words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will be entertained as to statutes’ scope and meaning,
and what auxiliary materials might be consulted to resolve ambiguities.” (quoting William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994))).
235. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2086, 2091; see also Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 74 (2000) (concluding that judges should embrace a formalist approach to
statutory interpretation and exclude legislative history).
236. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 803–04 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Common Law]
(discussing the “legislated interpretive rules and the separation of powers debate”); see also Jonathan
T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of
Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1246–47 (2002) (“[D]emonstrat[ing] that if we wish to make sense of judicial power over statutory interpretation . . . we must
ground judicial authority in the judiciary’s role in the constitutional structure and its internal institutional attributes.”); Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 918–19 (noting
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rather than legislatures, should choose statutory interpretation methods because legislatures may be driven by political motivations in their selection of
preferred interpretive methodologies.237 Supporters of legislatively created
rules of interpretation counter that statutory interpretation rules adopted by
federal courts are federal common law and, like other federal common law,
can be changed by Congress.238 Supporters also argue that the Judicial Branch
is as likely as the Legislative Branch to adopt interpretation rules based on
policy preferences.239
Professor Rosenkranz adopts the position taken by many supporters of
legislatively created statutory interpretation rules and analogizes interpretation rules to common law, but he acknowledges that legislatures are limited,
to some extent, in their authority to establish interpretation rules that are binding on courts.240 He argues that rules of statutory interpretation come in different forms.241 In some cases, the Constitution may require that a statute be
interpreted in a particular manner or prohibit an interpretation, in which case,
neither Congress nor courts can depart from the constitutionally required or
prohibited interpretation.242 In other cases, the Constitution may not express
any position on the appropriate interpretation of a statute, in which case Congress can adopt rules to control the interpretation.243 Finally, in some cases,
that “[s]cholars are divided on Congress’s constitutional power to dictate the interpretive methods
federal courts use in statutory cases”).
237. See Chelsea A. Bunge-Bollman, United We Stand, Divided We Fall? An Inquiry into the Values and Shortcomings of a Uniform Methodology for Statutory Interpretation, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. REFLECTION 101, 108–09 (2019) (noting concerns regarding the politicization of statutory interpretation).
238. See Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 236, at 803 (citing Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use
of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2000) and
Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2156); see also Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note
115, at 918–19 (noting that those who support the view that interpretive rules are like federal common
law argue that Article I grants Congress the power to create or override these rules).
239. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2142–43.
240. Id. at 2086–87.
241. Id. at 2099 (listing the different kinds of statutory interpretation rules and how to change them).
242. Id. at 2087 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5–9, at 851 (3d
ed. 2000)); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 843 (1991) (discussing the role the Constitution plays in interpreting federal statutes); SUNSTEIN, supra note 217.
243. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2099. When the Constitution takes no position on whether
an interpretation of a statute is required or prohibited, Rosenkranz argues that the rules used to interpret
that statute are federal common law and can be changed by courts or Congress. Id.
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the Constitution may establish a default or starting point rule, but one which
can be changed by Congress.244 Accordingly, Rosenkranz maintains that
whether Congress can codify a rule of statutory interpretation will depend, in
most cases, on the constitutional status of the proposed rule, rather than on
separation of powers considerations.245
Rosenkranz and others ground their support for congressionally created
interpretation rules in the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I of the Constitution.246 Rosenkranz points out that rules mandating use of specific tools
of statutory interpretation can be necessary and proper for the execution of
legislative power “because they may improve the precision with which the
legislative power may be exercised.”247 In his article, Rosenkranz distinguishes statutes that impose interpretation rules on courts “based on whether
the statutes are (1) definitional or nondefinitional, (2) statute-specific or general in application, and (3) static or dynamic.”248 Regardless of the classifications, though, Rosenkranz reaches the same conclusion for all interpretive
statutes.249 Congress can adopt statutes requiring the utilization of interpretation rules as long as the Constitution does not prohibit the rule being adopted
or mandate an alternative rule.250 Although Rosenkranz defends the
244. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2092–94. Rosenkranz suggests that the rule of lenity might
be a constitutional starting point rule that can be changed by Congress. Id. at 2093. According to
Rosenkranz, a constitutional starting point rule is a rule that is required by the Constitution until Congress provides otherwise. Id. at 2095. Rosenkranz distinguishes constitutional starting point rules
from rules that he labels “constitutional default rules.” Id. at 2097–98. A constitutional default rule,
he argues, cannot be reversed by Congress, but Congress can include a clear statement in legislation
to avoid the effect of the rule. Id. at 2098. Citing the federalism canon as an example, Rosenkranz
distinguishes starting point and default rules by suggesting that Congress can reverse starting point
rules by any legislative act, while they must enact laws with clear statements to avoid the effect of
default rules. Id. at 2098–99.
245. See id. at 2088, 2098–99, 2102–03.
246. Id. at 2102 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1567–70, 1582–90 (2000) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress
to alter judicially created default rules and empowers Congress to displace the rules of the judiciary if
it so chooses).
247. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2102.
248. See id. at 2103.
249. See id. at 2139–40.
250. Id. at 2103–21. Rosenkranz argues that Congress is not only authorized to create uniform rules
of statutory interpretation but also is better situated than the courts to create those rules. Id. at 2143–
45. Courts, he explains, must wait for an appropriate case to establish rules and generally must establish them retroactively, whereas Congress can legislate holistically and prospectively. Id.
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constitutionality of congressionally adopted interpretation rules in all of the
cases outlined above, he recognizes that the adoption of interpretation rules
that apply generally, rather than limited to a single or a few statutes, could
result in some unanticipated interpretations when applied retroactively.251
Regarding theories of interpretation, Rosenkranz concluded that the Constitution does not mandate or prohibit the adoption of a textualist, purposivist,
or other theory of statutory interpretation, so it would be appropriate for Congress to enact laws that require the interpretation of a statute or statutes in a
textualist or purposivist manner.252 Accordingly, it would be consistent with
Congress’s authority to enact statutory directives, like the ones outlined
above, that require courts to interpret the federal environmental laws consistent with their health and environmental protection purposes.253 Further,
while Rosenkranz identified nonconstitutional concerns regarding the adoption of general retroactive interpretive statutes,254 the scope of the statutory
directives outlined in this Article is sufficiently limited such that Congress
could anticipate the effect of the directives on the interpretation of the federal
environmental laws in most cases.255
Other academics echo Professor Rosenkranz’s assertion that Congress
may constitutionally enact rules of interpretation to be applied by courts.256
Professor Abbe Gluck, for instance, has argued that many statutory interpretation rules have the nature of federal common law, even though courts frequently refuse to acknowledge that they are common law or treat them as

251. Id. at 2113–14. Amending the entire U.S. Code with a retrospective interpretive statute, he
argues, “might be foolish, but it is surely constitutional.” Id. at 2114. Rosenkranz also acknowledges
that Laurence Tribe has suggested that general interpretive statutes that apply prospectively raise constitutional concerns because they impermissibly bind future Congresses and limit their Article I legislative power. Id. at 2114–15. Rosenkranz is unpersuaded by Tribe’s concern, though, as he notes that
future Congresses could avoid the restrictions imposed on interpretation of their enactments by amending the offending interpretation rule that was adopted by the prior Congress. Id. at 2115–20.
252. Id. at 2109, 2124–25. Rosenkranz contends that “there is no constitutional objection to an . . .
instruction [that]: ‘The United States Code shall be interpreted in textualist fashion, without reference
to legislative history.’” Id. at 2124–25.
253. See id. at 2103–21.
254. See id. at 2113–20.
255. See Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 851 (2004) (proposing a model for federal
agencies for interpreting statutes).
256. See Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 236, at 757.
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common law.257 She has also noted that courts frequently apply the Chevron
two-step test (a judicially created tool of statutory interpretation) in a manner
akin to federal common law.258 If the rules of statutory interpretation created
by courts are federal common law, then they can be amended or adopted by
Congress, as noted above.259 Professor Gluck has also noted that Congress
has already adopted “thousands” of rules of construction, “including preemption clauses, savings clauses, and severability clauses,” which courts routinely
and unquestioningly apply.260 The application of those rules is consistent with
the widely espoused model of the judicial role in statutory interpretation as
the “faithful agent” of the legislature.261
Professor Kevin Stack has advanced similar arguments in support of his
proposal for a broader transformation of interpretation and application of regulatory statutes by administrative agencies and courts in light of congressional
directives in those statutes.262 Stack argues that modern “[r]egulatory statutes
not only grant powers but . . . impose a duty on agencies to carry out those
powers in accordance with the . . . purposes the statutes establish.”263 He finds
the source of that duty in the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution and
in the Administrative Procedure Act.264 Stack argues that since the Constitution requires Congress to provide agencies with an “intelligible principle” to
guide interpretation and administration of statutes, agencies must interpret and
administer those statutes to carry out the purposes established in the

257. See id. at 755–59, 770, 777.
258. See id. at 759, 770–71, 791.
259. See id. at 757 (highlighting that some canons of statutory interpretation may be considered
federal common law, while some “might be understood as a special kind of law that enforces constitutional norms or implements the Constitution”).
260. See id. at 791–92, 801–03. Gluck notes that a Westlaw search of the U.S. Code for the phrase
“shall be construed” yields over 5,000 results. Id. at 802. She also indicates that she and Professor
Lisa Bressman interviewed 137 congressional counsels and that more than one-third of them had
“drafted or considered drafting” rules for interpretation for the courts. Id. at 803.
261. Id. at 756.
262. See Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 871.
263. Id. Stack argues that agencies are “better positioned than courts to discern statutory purposes”
because they are frequently involved in the drafting of the statutes, implement them on a day-to-day
basis, have greater expertise than courts regarding the issues addressed in the statutes, and are more
politically accountable than courts. Id. at 906–07, 909.
264. See id. at 893–94, 899.
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statutes.265 Agencies’ statutory interpretation must be guided by purposivism.266 Similarly, Stack argues that the judicial review of agency actions under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard requires agencies to
demonstrate that their actions are rationally connected to the purposes of the
statutes they administer.267 After outlining the case for agencies’ adoption of
purposivism in statutory interpretation, Stack agrees with Rosenkranz and
Gluck that the judicial power to create rules of statutory interpretation, if it
exists, is a federal common law power that can be modified by congressional
action.268 When Congress has directed agencies to interpret and administer
laws to carry out specific purposes, Stack argues that courts must honor those
legislative directives and adopt a purposivist approach when interpreting those
statutes.269
Other commentators have agreed with Rosenkranz regarding the constitutionality of statutory directives but have raised different concerns about his
proposal.270 For instance, in an article published in response to Rosenkranz’s
proposal, Gary O’Connor described judicially created statutory interpretation
rules as a form of common law, and like Professor Gluck, he noted that Congress has adopted statutory interpretation rules in the past that have been applied by courts.271 However, he was skeptical that either Congress or the
courts would adopt a uniform set of rules for statutory interpretation.272
265. Id. at 875–76, 887, 893–95.
266. Id. at 875.
267. Id. at 899–900.
268. Id. at 919.
269. Id. at 871, 877–78. Professor Stack criticizes the way the Chevron doctrine has been applied
in that it authorizes the use of traditional tools of interpretation at Step One and has not focused sufficiently on a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 882–83. Instead of utilizing Chevron, Stack argues that reviewing courts should focus on whether an agency action furthers a statute’s
purpose(s) by means allowed by the statute or other law, looking at “(1) the agency’s understanding
of the statute’s purpose(s), (2) the connection the agency has drawn between its actions and those
purposes, (3) whether the action is otherwise permitted by existing statutory and constitutional and
other law, and (4) whether the action is well-founded in fact.” Id. at 921. Since agencies are obligated
to interpret and administer statutes to carry out the purposes identified in the statute, Stack reasons
that even textualist judges would have to adopt purposivist readings of regulatory statutes. Id. at 924.
Stack asserts that the purposivist framework of judicial review is consistent with the APA review
standards, which focus on the rationality of agency decisions and whether they are authorized by the
Constitution and the agency’s statutory authority. Id. at 921–22.
270. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 221, at 334–36.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 347–48. Rosenkranz’s proposal for the Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation
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Consequently, he argued that academics should create a Restatement of the
Law of Statutory Interpretation in the same way that they have created Restatements for other areas of common law, such as contracts.273 Professor
Lawrence Solan, however, criticized O’Connor’s proposal, arguing that a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation would be destructive because the rules
would never really be applied uniformly, so the Restatement would create an
illusion of consensus in statutory interpretation and allow judges to continue
to make decisions consistent with their political preferences, cloaking the decisions in legitimacy by supporting them with “uniform” rules.274
Professor Glen Staszewski has leveled similar criticisms at a range of efforts to simplify and create uniformity in statutory interpretation.275
Staszewski, like Solan, argues that uniform rules allow courts to make decisions that ignore the goals of statutes by cloaking them in the legitimacy of
uniform rules, and he argues that efforts to “dumb down” statutory interpretation ignore the reality that “the central function of statutory interpretation by
federal courts in the modern regulatory state is to provide individuals and
groups with opportunities to contest the validity of particular exercises of governmental authority, rather than to ascertain the meaning of the law in a
envisions enactment by Congress and the President at the outset, followed by approval by the Supreme
Court, all of which O’Connor views as doubtful. Id. He is particularly skeptical that a majority of
Justices on the Supreme Court could reach consensus on uniform rules that would be binding in all of
the cases that would be heard by the Court, as well as the lower federal courts. Id.
273. Id. at 334, 349–51. O’Connor argues that a Restatement would provide similar benefits as a
codification of uniform rules (since Restatements are frequently viewed by courts and attorneys as
authoritative) but would not require action by Congress or the courts. Id. at 356–57. He also argues
that a Restatement would be valuable in providing uniformity because there are no treatises that otherwise adequately provide that guidance for statutory interpretation. Id. at 337–44. He acknowledges,
however, that a Restatement would not be binding on courts. Id. at 360–61.
274. See Solan, Is It Time, supra note 231, at 733–35. Solan asserted that “an authoritative, black
letter text is likely to be used by judges as yet more cover for the positions they wish to take in close
cases.” Id. at 742. In addition to fearing the illegitimate use of a Restatement as a tool to legitimize
judicial activism, Solan does not believe that there is any underlying consensus regarding appropriate
methods of statutory interpretation that could be incorporated into a Restatement. Id. at 742–43, 753–
54. He argues that (1) judges might agree on the principles of interpretation but disagree upon the
weight to give to various principles in individual cases; (2) most statutory interpretation cases are
about vagueness, and predictive rules cannot predict results in those cases; and (3) judges vacillate, in
practice, between interpreting statutory language in terms of the outer boundaries of the language or
in terms of ordinary usage. Id. at 742–43.
275. See Staszewski, supra note 218, at 210. His article focuses on “proposals to adopt codified
rules of statutory interpretation, give stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology, use simpler
methods of statutory interpretation in lower courts and implement certain versions of textualism.” Id.
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vacuum.”276 He worries that “to the extent that the proposals would establish
artificial decisionmaking frameworks that would resolve statutory disputes
without regard to their policy consequences or Congress’s apparent goals, the
result would be affirmatively undemocratic.”277
Regardless of whether a Restatement of the Law of Statutory Interpretation or a uniform codification of all of the rules of statutory interpretation
would mask activist judicial decisionmaking, the proposal in this Article is
much more moderate and would provide far fewer opportunities for courts to
manipulate statutory interpretation because it does not call for a codification
of the full range of statutory interpretation tools.278 In addition, to the extent
that Staszewski raises concerns that uniform interpretation tools could provide
courts with resources to interpret statutes without regard to their goals,279 the
proposal in this Article would affirmatively require courts to interpret the federal environmental laws consistently with their enacted purposes.280 The proposal is consistent with the vision of Professor Stack, who argues that agencies
and courts should interpret regulatory statutes through purposivism, but agencies and courts have not routinely done so in the past, so more explicit congressional direction is likely required.281
276. Id. at 210. Staszewski argues that “the primary goal of statutory interpretation methodology
should be to protect the people from the possibility of domination by the state.” Id. He believes that
when the democratically elected legislature has not clearly indicated its preferences in the language of
a statute, the best way to avoid the potential for arbitrary domination is for courts to uphold reasonable
interpretations of the statute adopted by agencies that are delegated authority to administer those statutes, rather than by relying on rigid rules of interpretation. Id. at 210, 241–42.
277. Id. at 237. According to Staszewski, “courts affirmatively promote republican democracy
when they engage in hard look judicial review of agency action or otherwise provide individuals or
groups with a meaningful opportunity to contest a statute’s application to their conduct.” Id. at 241–
42.
278. Compare Staszewski, supra note 218, at 278 (criticizing prominent proposals “for making statutory interpretation simpler and more uniform” because of “the importance of avoiding the possibility
of arbitrary domination by the state and a belief in the value of practical reasoning and diverse perspectives within the interpretive enterprise”), with supra notes 216–25 and accompanying text (discussing how statutory directives generally are a targeted and moderate approach to ensuring accurate
statutory interpretation).
279. See Staszewski, supra note 218, at 243.
280. Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text; supra Part VI.
281. See Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 875–76 (discussing the
suggestion that Congress specifies the framework for agency statutory interpretation). As noted above,
it may be necessary to provide more explicit legislative direction to agencies, as well, regarding an
obligation to administer and interpret the federal environmental laws in ways that advance the enacted
purposes. See supra note 224.
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While Rosenkranz, Gluck, and others express confidence in congressional authority to adopt statutory directives, many commentators argue that
statutory interpretation is a judicial function and that congressional attempts
to dictate the methods of interpretation may violate separation of powers principles, infringing on the Article III powers of the Judicial Branch.282 Few of
these critics, however, assert that all statutory directives violate separation of
powers principles.283 Instead, most of these critics argue that specific types of
statutory directives are unconstitutional.284
Professor Linda Jellum, for example, divides statutory directives into
three categories: (1) definitional, where the legislative goal is to define a term;
(2) interpretive, where the goal is to affect the outcome of interpretation; and
(3) theoretical, where the goal is to affect the process of interpretation.285 In
an interpretive directive, the legislature is attempting to promote specific policy outcomes, while in a theoretical directive, the legislature is attempting to
promote a specific interpretive process without regard to advancing any policy
outcome.286 Jellum identifies as interpretive a hypothetical directive that provides, “All Acts of Congress shall be broadly construed with a view to promote the Act’s purposes and carry out the intent of the legislature.”287 By
contrast, Jellum identifies directives that limit the sources that a court can use
in interpreting a statute as theoretical.288 The statutory directives proposed in
this Article for the federal environmental laws would, therefore, be interpretive directives in Jellum’s taxonomy.289
In analyzing whether particular directives raise constitutional concerns,
Professor Jellum notes that legal scholars have adopted two distinct
282. See Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2086, 2091; Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 236,
at 804–05.
283. Compare Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 918–19 (describing
the viewpoint of “judicial interpretive methodology as . . . akin in status to federal common law,” and
thus, “Congress’s Article I powers presumptively include the power to establish [interpretive] rules[]
. . . [with] no general separation of powers objection”), with Jellum, supra note 32, at 879 (describing
that certain statutory directives violate separation of powers while others do not).
284. See, e.g., Jellum, supra note 32, at 879.
285. Id. at 841, 847.
286. Id. at 882–83, 893.
287. Id. at 840.
288. See id. at 848–49. Professor Jellum notes that Congress has enacted a theoretical directive that
applies to a single statute but has not yet adopted a general theoretical directive. See id. at 852.
289. See Jellum, supra note 32, at 893 (discussing that under “a specific interpretive directive, the
legislature is attempting . . . to make its policy choice for that particular statute clear”).
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approaches to addressing separation of powers issues.290 The formalist approach divides the three branches of government based on the functions assigned by the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses and rigidly decides that separation of powers principles are violated when a branch is carrying out a function
assigned to another branch by the Vesting Clauses.291 The functionalist approach, on the other hand, recognizes that the functions assigned to the various
branches are more fluid and condemns the exercise of power by a branch only
when additional powers beyond the branch’s core powers are exercised by the
branch in a way that inappropriately aggrandizes the branch while withdrawing constitutionally assigned power from another branch.292
After outlining the two conflicting approaches to identifying unconstitutional delegations of interbranch power, Professor Jellum concludes that definitional statutory directives are constitutional under either approach,293 while
theoretical directives violate separation of powers principles under either approach.294 Interpretive directives, though, Jellum argues, violate separation of
powers under the formalist approach295 but not under the functionalist approach.296 Nevertheless, Professor Jellum argues that some interpretive directives are constitutional.297 When an interpretive directive applies to a single
290. See id. at 854–55, 860–61.
291. See id. at 861–62, 867–68. Under a formalist approach, “[l]egislative power . . . is the power
‘to promulgate generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to
achieve, maintain, or avoid particular social policy results.’” Id. at 862 (quoting Martin H. Redish &
Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)). Judicial power is the power to interpret the law—to “say[]
what [the] law means.” Id. at 867.
292. See id. at 870–72, 875. Functionalism recognizes the judiciary as a partner to the legislature
in lawmaking, as opposed to a “faithful agent.” See id. at 871–72. The legislature can play a role in
influencing interpretation of the law, but Professor Jellum argues that “when the legislature tries to
control the process of interpretation, as opposed to trying to influence the outcome . . . to promote
specific policy objectives, the legislature aggrandizes itself, . . . impermissibly intrudes into the judicial
sphere, and becomes master of the interpretive process.” Id. at 837.
293. Id. at 841–42, 879.
294. Id. at 841–42, 879, 882. Under the formalist approach, Jellum argues that when theoretical
directives tell judges what evidence to consider in interpreting statutes, their purpose is not to affect
legal rights but to control the judicial function. See id. at 882–83. The legislature is, thus, attempting
to exercise judicial functions. Id. Under the functionalist approach, Jellum argues that theoretical
directives “allow Congress to intrude into a core judicial function and aggrandize its role while simultaneously contracting the roles of the judiciary and the executive.” Id. at 883.
295. Id. at 890–91.
296. Id. at 890, 894.
297. See id. at 841–42, 890, 894.
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statute, Jellum argues, the legislature is trying to influence the interpretive
outcome regarding a specific policy choice for that statute and is not aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch.298 When, on the other hand,
an interpretive directive applies generally to all of the statutes in a legislative
code, Jellum concludes that the legislature is attempting to control the process
of statutory interpretation, which would be unconstitutional.299
Professor Jellum does not discuss whether she believes that an interpretive directive that applies to more than one law but does not apply generally,
such as the proposal in this Article regarding the federal environmental laws,
would be unconstitutional.300 However, the proposal in this Article is much
more like an interpretive directive that applies to one law than an interpretive
directive that applies generally, in that the proposal is trying to influence interpretive outcomes regarding specific policy choices rather than attempting
to control the process of statutory interpretation.301 Thus, the proposal would
probably be constitutional based on Professor Jellum’s reasoning.302 However, if the rule advanced by Professor Jellum is binary, in that an interpretive
directive may be constitutional if it applies to a single statute but unconstitutional if it applies to more than one, any constitutional “defect” in the proposal
advanced in this Article could be cured by introducing statutory directives for
each of the federal environmental laws through separate legislative proposals.303
298. See id. at 841, 895–96.
299. See id. at 895–96. Professor Jellum acknowledges that an interpretive directive that directs
courts to interpret an individual statute broadly tangentially affects the process used to interpret the
statute but that the legislature is attempting “to influence the interpretive outcome regarding a specific
policy choice for that statute.” See id. at 896. However, an interpretive directive that applies generally
may tangentially advance a particular policy choice, but the purpose of the directive would be “to
control the judiciary’s method of interpretation regardless of . . . [the] policy [outcome].” See id.
300. See id. at 895 (suggesting “that the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional directives lies in the difference between specific interpretive directives, those that apply to one statute,
and general interpretive directives, those that apply to the entire code,” but not defining where a directive that applies to several laws, but not an entire code, falls along that spectrum).
301. See id. at 841, 895–96.
302. See id.
303. Id. at 897. Professor Jellum acknowledges as much in her article, indicating that Congress
could avoid the distinction that she identifies between general and specific interpretive directives because “Congress could add the identical interpretive directive to every new or existing statute.” Id. at
897. She is skeptical that such legislative efforts are feasible but argues that “if Congress were successful in this effort, the judiciary could, at least, have some assurance that Congress might have actually considered the effect of such a directive on the specific policy choices for each affected statute.”
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While Professor Jellum and others have questioned the constitutionality
of statutory directives, some commentators suggest that courts already utilize
canons that achieve what the proposal in this Article seeks to achieve. For
instance, courts have long applied a canon that provides that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed.304 Under that canon, the federal environmental
laws, as remedial statutes, should be interpreted liberally to carry out their
purposes.305 More directly on point, though, Professor Kevin Stack asserts
that courts utilize an enacted purposes canon for statutory interpretation.306
Under this canon, courts will not interpret statutes in a way that negates their
enacted purposes.307 According to Stack, the Supreme Court utilized this
canon in several cases without explicitly labeling it as a canon,308 including:
Johnson v. Robison;309 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill;310 Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit;311 and King v. Burwell.312 Stack argues
that by limiting the focus of the canon to those purposes explicitly identified
in the legislation’s enacted purposes clauses, the canon provides a bridge between textualism and purposivism.313
Stack suggests that special rules of interpretation should apply to statutes
with enacted statements of purpose314 because such statutes have different
meanings than statutes without statements of purpose, since a rule, in general,
that is created with an accompanying statement of purpose or justification has
a different meaning than the same rule created without that explanation of
Id.
304. See Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 236, at 763, 769. “The canon . . . has been
described as a buffer against pressures on Congress by special interests to narrow public interest statutes.” Id. at 769 (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
305. See id. at 769 (noting that statutes that are remedial in nature should be broadly construed).
306. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 285.
307. See id. at 285 (citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 493 (2015)). The canon does not, however, require courts to interpret statutes to advance the enacted purposes of statutes. See id. at 303.
Stack argues that it is evident that Congress views the enacted purposes provisions of statutes as significant parts of the statutes because Congress has amended such statements over the years in statutes.
See id. at 307–08.
308. See id. at 285.
309. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
310. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
311. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
312. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
313. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 285–86, 313–16.
314. Id.
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purpose or justification.315 The articulation of the purpose changes the meaning of the rule.316 He also argues that statutes that include enacted purposes
clauses are more “public-regarding” than other statutes, so they should be interpreted to advance the public-regarding goals of the statutes.317
Even if courts more formally recognized the enacted purposes canon as
Stack asserts that they should,318 neither that canon nor the remedial statutes
canon nor any other canon would be as effective in reinvigorating the federal
environmental laws as the statutory directives proposed in this Article. As
academics have noted for decades, for most canons of interpretation there are
counter-canons that direct courts to interpret statutes in a manner that is the
obverse of the canon.319 Opposing the remedial statutes canon, for instance,
is the canon that provides that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be interpreted narrowly.320 Without concrete, uniform rules regarding
the application of canons, judges will always be able to choose the appropriate
canon to interpret a statute in the manner consistent with their personal views
regarding the “best” reading of the statute.321
Even if courts applied the canons uniformly, though, an enacted purposes
canon would be inferior to the statutory directives proposed in this Article.322
An enacted purposes canon simply requires courts to avoid interpreting statutes in ways that negate their purposes.323 It does not require courts to

315. See id. at 305–08.
316. See id. at 306.
317. Id. at 310–13.
318. See id. at 316–17, 333. Professor Stack suggests that the canon should be formally recognized
as a canon because it has been relied on “scores of times over decades” for almost a century, and “by
Supreme Court Justices appointed by different parties and across the ideological [spectrum].” See id.
at 317 (citing Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163
(2019)).
319. See Llewellyn, supra note 233, at 401; see also Rosenkranz, supra note 31, at 2143–44; Solan,
Is It Time, supra note 231, at 743–44.
320. See Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 236, at 769.
321. See Solan, Is It Time, supra note 231, at 734 (arguing that even with a codification of rules for
statutory interpretation, judges would be able to “create the illusion of certainty in a world in which
they have more discretion than they are comfortable acknowledging”); see Rosenkranz, supra note 31,
at 2148 (discussing how canons can be “simply a veneer for judges’ policy preferences”).
322. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 303 (observing that enacted purposes
serve only to exclude interpretations that conflict with the stated purpose but do not require courts to
interpret statutes to carry forward that stated purpose).
323. See Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 285.
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interpret statutes to advance those purposes.324 A statutory directive, on the
other hand, would require courts to interpret the environmental statutes to
achieve the purposes of the statute, and the directive would be embedded in
the text of the statute, to be applied by textualists and purposivists alike, rather
than embodied in a canon that courts might or might not utilize.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress set ambitious goals to protect public health and the environment
when it enacted the federal environmental laws through bipartisan efforts in
the 1970s.325 For many years, the federal courts interpreted those laws to carry
out those enacted purposes.326 Over time, however, courts greatly reduced
their focus on the environmental and public health purposes of the environmental laws due to the rise in textualism, the declining influence of Chevron,
and the increasing willingness of courts to defer to agency underenforcement
of statutory responsibilities across all regulatory statutes.327
Those trends are unlikely to be reversed in the near future, so further congressional action is required to reinvigorate the federal environmental laws.
Through statutory directives that provide that the environmental laws should
be interpreted to carry out their enacted purposes, Congress could send a clear
message to courts that Congress remains committed to the goals articulated in
the environmental laws.328 Textualist judges would find it difficult to ignore
the statutory purposes when interpreting the environmental laws, as the text
of the laws would require the laws to be interpreted to advance those purposes.329 Similarly, judges who ignore Chevron to avoid deferring to an
agency’s environmentally friendly interpretation would be unable to reject the
agency’s position through their own statutory interpretation without addressing the statutory directive in the law requiring an interpretation of the law that
324. See id. at 303.
325. See Lazarus & Zdeb, supra note 6 (stating that during the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress
adopted more than two dozen environmental laws with broad bipartisan support).
326. See supra Section III.A (discussing federal courts’ historical interpretation of major federal
environmental laws in the first few decades after their passage according to the health and environmental protection purposes embedded in the laws).
327. See discussion supra Section III.B and Parts IV, V.
328. See supra Part VI.
329. See Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 115, at 924; Stack, Enacted Purposes Canon, supra note 22, at 285–86, 306, 308, 314–15.
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carries out its public health and environmental purposes.330
While statutory directives have been underutilized at the federal level,
Congress has the constitutional authority to include them in legislation.331 At
this point, therefore, the question is not whether Congress can amend the environmental statutes to include statutory directives but whether Congress has
the will to reinvigorate those statutes.

330. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
331. See supra Part VII.
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